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CRIMINAL LAW
With ready-made opinons one cannot judge of crime. Its
Philosophy is a little more complicated than people think.
-FYODOR DOSTOYEVSKY, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD.
DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW-1950-1960
CHARLES A. BELLOWS, JASON E. BELLOWS,
AND SHERMAN C. MAGIDSON
INTRODUCTION
NY WRITER WHO attempts to cover all of the changes which have
taken place in the area of criminal law during the space of a
decade in one, limited, law review article does himself and his
readers a disservice, and the field an injustice. Criminal law, as it is
practiced from day to day in the trial and appellate courts in contrast
to the way in which it is taught in the law schools, embodies consider-
ations most often isolated by the labels "Constitutional Law" and
"Evidence." In addition, certain aspects of the usual course in "Plead-
ing" often crop up in the trial of a criminal case. Hence, no compre-
hensive-annotated type of article covering all of the changes in this
vast field over the past ten years could be completed. Instead, the pur-
pose of this article is to give a brief summary of the significant changes
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in Illinois criminal law which have taken place during the period 1950
to 1960. In many cases whole areas will be neglected, but, as is the case
with the Post Conviction Act,* it is believed that generally they will
be found elsewhere in this edition, and there treated with far more
comprehensiveness than is possible in this article. Wherever possible,
references to the latest articles covering a certain aspect of the crimi-
nal law will be made.
Despite the many subheadings which appear worthy of use in deal-
ing with the criminal law, when speaking of changes only, two cor-
rectly present the subject in its proper focus: procedure and substance.
One objective herein is to segregate, as well as possible, changes in
procedure from changes in substance. Further, within these two cate-
gories the subject matter will be viewed from the standpoints of both
statutory and case law changes.
PART I
CHANGES IN THE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
A. AN EXAMINATION OF DISCOVERY AND APPELLATE PROCEDURE
The two most significant changes in criminal procedure in the past
decade, based upon applicability to the greatest number of cases, con-
cern discovery and appellate practice. The Legislature of 1957 amended
section 1 of division XIII of the CRIMINAL CODE,' to provide that prior
to arraignment the State must furnish the defendant or his counsel a
copy of any written confession or a list of witnesses to any oral con-
fession. The act further provided that unless the copy of the confes-
sion or the list of witnesses was furnished in accordance therewith, the
confession could not be admitted in evidence. In 1959, the Legislature
modified this provision2 to allow the court, upon the motion of either
party, or upon its own motion, to permit the service of the copy of the
confession or list of witnesses after arraignment. The Supreme Court
of Illinois in People v. Pelkola, held this statute to be mandatory and
ruled that where the statute was not complied with the confession
could not be used either in chief or in rebuttal. However, the court
further held that under the circumstances of the case, the error was
harmless.
* See generally Starrs, The Post-Conviction Hearing Act-1949-1960 and Beyond,
10DE PAUL L. REv. 397 (1961).
1 11. Laws 1957, at 1116.
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 729 (1959).
3 19 Ill.2d 156, 166 N.E.2d 54 (1960).
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While in many respects a rule of evidence, the statutory provisions
outlined above are in reality a form of discovery. They are meant to
apprise the defendant of a very important piece of the State's evidence,
his confession. While it may be argued that the defendant ought to
know as well as anyone the contents of his statements made to police
and prosecuting officials, the stresses of the situation might cause him
to lack memory of significant details of the statement. Furthermore, as
a matter of the practical disposition of a criminal case, this statute has
great significance. The philosophy behind all discovery procedures,
whether civil or criminal, includes the idea that the issues should be
resolved as quickly as possible with the the least amount of contro-
versy and litigation. A defendant served with a copy of his confession
may readily see that his cause is hopeless and plead guilty, thus lessen-
ing his own punishment and saving the people considerable expense.
The second discovery procedure made available to defendants in
Illinois criminal cases arose out of two decisions of the Illinois Supreme
Court. People v. Moses,4 decided in 1957, held that a defendant in a
criminal case was entitled, for purposes of impeachment, to not only
the statements made by witnesses to the police and prosecuting offi-
cials, but also to the intradepartmental reports of the police depart-
ment which contained material relating to the impeachment of the
witness. The decision is silent as to how the information in the intra-
departmental reports was impeaching, except that there is the implica-
tion that they contained evidence that a description of the person who
committed the crime differing from that given at the trial was given by
the complaining witnesses to the police. The court said:
... In this case, identification of the accused was crucial. There is no sugges-
tion that the public interest could be prejudiced by divulging these records,
and no other ground of privilege is apparent. Where it appears that there is
evidence in the possession and control of the prosecution favorable to the de-
fendant, "a right sense of justice demands that it should be available, unless
there are strong reasons otherwise."5
Three years later, in People v. Wolff,6 the Supreme Court set forth
clearer standards for the production of statements made by a witness
to the police or prosecuting agency. First, the court said:
... All authorities examined agree that use of documents produced under the
rule [of People v. Moses] is restricted to impeachment, thus it is held that only
4 11 Ill.2d 84, 142 N.E.2d 1 (1957).
5 Id. at 89, 142 N.E.2d at 4 (quoting, in part, from People v. Walsh, 262 N.Y. 140, 150,
186N.E.422,425 (1933)).
6 19 ll.2d 318, 167 N.E.2d 197 (1960).
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statements or reports which could properly be called in the witness's own
words should be made available to the defense. More specifically, as pointed
out by the Supreme Court of the United States, the demand must be for "spe-
cific statements which had been written by the witness or, if orally made, as
recorded by agents of the Government."7
The second consideration was stated as follows:
While some of the cited decisions, and others, contain language which sug-
gests that the foundation evidence must likewise establish that the statement
or report made by the witness is contradictory to his testimony at the trial,
that concept has been discarded in later cases as being manifestly unfair (since
contradiction can hardly be determined until the statement is produced), and
the better view, to which we subscribe, is that "For production purposes, it
need only appear that the evidence is relevant, competent, and outside any
exclusionary rule."
The last of the standards was promulgated as follows:
•.. [W]e adopt the view that where no privilege exists, and where the rele-
vancy and competency of a statement or report has been established, the trial
judge shall order the document delivered directly to the accused for his in-
spection and use for impeachment purposes. However, if the prosecution
claims that any document ordered to be produced contains matter which does
not relate to the testimony of the witness sought to be impeached, the trial
judge will inspect the document and may, at his discretion, delete unrelated
matters before delivery is made to the accused.0
One aspect of the problem is only hinted at by the court in the
Wolff case. That is the question of whether the court may direct the
documents turned over to the defendant only after the witness has
testified, as is the present Federal rule,"0 or whether it may be ordered
given to the accused prior to the testimony of the witness. The prob-
lem is not one in which there can be a hard and fast rule, and should
be committed to the discretion of the trial judge. In the average case in
which there have not been any extensive statements made by witnesses,
it would seem proper that the document should be turned over to the
defendant only after the witness has testified. However, in the case
wherein there are many prosecution witnesses and they have made
several statements each to police officers, prosecuting attorneys, and
other investigators of the State, the statements should very well be pro-
7 Id. at 323, 167 N.E.2d at 199 (quoting, in part, from Palermo v. United States, 360
U.S. 343, 345-46 (1959)).
8 Id. at 324, 167 N.E.2d at 200 (quoting, in part, from Gordon v. United States,
344 U.S. 414, 420, and Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 667 (1956)).
o Id. at 327, 167 N.E.2d at 201-02.
10 18 U.S.C.A. § 3500 (Supp. 1960).
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duced not only prior to the time when the witness testifies but prior to
the trial. A long trial can only be made longer when the counsel for the
defendant or defendants must stop the trial, inspect the documents,
and only then proceed with the cross-examination of the witness. This
time interval may be hours or days if there are many statements from
the witness and many counsel who must inspect them. If the trial
judge attempts to limit the time for inspection in order to prevent a
jury from having to waste precious time, he may in effect, render the
discovery rule a nullity. The seriousness of such action is seen most
clearly in the light of the realization by the Supreme Court of this state
that" 'the commands of the Constitution were ... close to the surface' "
of the rule.1 ' In at least one case in the Criminal Court of Cook Coun-
ty," the trial judge has ordered all documents containing statements of
prosecution witnesses produced prior to trial, thus shortening the time
of trial from a possible six to eight weeks to four weeks.
Turning aside from the developments in the law of discovery, the
change in criminal procedure which affects an even greater number of
defendants is that in the law of appellate procedure. Strictly speaking,
the greatest change is not one of procedure but one of making the
procedure available to all defendants. In this state, no point may be
raised on review in a criminal case which concerns the weight of the
evidence, the rulings made at the trial, or any error made at the trial of
the case, unless it is properly preserved in the bill of exceptions.'3 The
bill of exceptions, while permitted to be in narrative form prepared
from someone's memory (the so-called bystanders' bill of exceptions)
has, since the inception of court reporting, consisted of the steno-
graphic report of proceedings. 14 This report has had to be purchased
from the stenographer, except in capital cases, where by statute, in the
case of an indigent defendant, the trial court could order that the
county pay for all the expenses of a review." In the 1956 case of Grif-
"1 People v. Wolff, 19 Ill.2d 318, 327, 167 N.E.2d 197, 201 (1960) (quoting from con-
curring opinion in Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1959)).
12 People v. Hansen, No. 59-2110, Crim. Ct., Cook County, Ill. (1959). Although this
case was tried prior to the decision of the Wolff case, there is no language in the
Volff case which would indicate that the procedure followed in Hansen was not valid.
1'People v. Hamm, 415 Ill. 224, 112 N.E.2d 485 (1953); People v. Ball, 412 Ill. 37,
104 N.E.2d 774 (1952); People v. Allen, 411 Ill. 582, 104 N.E.2d 768 (1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952).
14 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 14, n. 4 (1955).
15 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 769a (1959).
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fin v. Illinois,'8 the Supreme Court of the United States held that the
failure to provide for the furnishing of a bill of exceptions for all in-
digent prisoners was a denial of equal protection. Mr. Justice Black,
announcing the judgment of the Court, said:
All of the States now provide some method of appeal from criminal convic-
tions, recognizing the importance of appellate review to a correct adjudication
of guilt or innocence .... [T]o deny adequate review to the poor means that
many of them may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust con-
victions which appellate courts would set aside. Many States have recognized
this and provided aid for convicted defendants who have a right to appeal and
need a transcript but are unable to pay for it. A few have not. Such a denial
is a misfit in a country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special
privileges to none in the administration of its criminal law. There can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of
money he has. Destitute defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate re-
view as defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.' 7
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in the judgment, stated with his
characteristic pungency:
... [W]hen a State deems it wise and just that convictions be susceptible to
review by an appellate court, it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line
which precludes convicted indigent persons, forsooth erroneously convicted,
from securing such a review merely by disabling them from bringing to the
notice of an appellate tribunal errors of the trial court which would upset the
conviction were practical opportunity for review not foreclosed.
To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably resulting from a money
hurdle erected by a State, would justify a latter-day Anatole France to add
one more item to his ironic comments on the "majestic equality" of the law.
"The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep
under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."' 8
Upon remand, the Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the ruling of
the trial court on the petition under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hear-
ing Act,' and ordered the trial court to order that a copy of the tran-
script of record be furnished to the defendant.2 °
Concomitant with the opinion in the Griffin case, the Supreme
Court of Illinois adopted rule 65-1.21 This rule codified the procedure
to be followed by persons desiring transcripts of their trial furnished to
them. This article will not cover these procedures and those following.
16 351 U.S. 12 (1955).
17 Id. at 18.
s Id. at 23.
19 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, SS 826-32 (1959).
20 People v. Griffin, 9 1.2d 164, 137 N.E.2d 485 (1956).
21 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 101.65-1 (1959).
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However, they have been excellently treated in an article which ap-
peared in the Illinois Bar Journal in 1959.22 Two decisions of the
Supreme Court of Illinois are of importance in this area and should be
discussed, if briefly. In People v. Munroe," the court held that where
a writ of error had issued prior to the expiration of the twenty-year
common-law limitations upon writs of error, a transcript of trial pro-
ceedings obtained pursuant to rule 65-1 after the expiration of the
twenty-year period was an additional record, reviewable by the origi-
nal writ of error. However, in People v. Berman,24 the court held that
where the defendant had been convicted in 1930, had taken no action
whatsoever to review his conviction until 1954-when he filed a peti-
tion under the Post Conviction Hearing Act-and had not filed a peti-
tion for writ of error under rule 65-1 until 1959, "the limitation period
heretofore recognized must be construed as a proscription against the
application of rule 65-1... ."25 In Berman, the court also ruled that the
fact that a transcript was unobtainable because no court reporter was
provided to take shorthand notes of the trial proceedings, did not re-
quire a reversal as constituting a denial of due process or of equal protec-
26tion.
Two further changes in appellate procedure should be noted. Rule
65-2 of the Supreme Court2 7 abolished all distinctions between the
common-law record and the bill of exceptions or report of proceed-
ings at the trial, for the purpose of determining what is properly before
the reviewing court in a criminal case. This rule eliminated the former
practice, in which certain matters had to be set forth in the bill of ex-
ceptions in order to be preserved for review, such as the motion for
new trial,28 the motion challenging the grand jury,29 the motion to sup-
press evidence8 0 and a motion for a continuance.81 The proceedings
22 Sullivan, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Illinois Supreme Court Rule
6S-1, 47 ILL. B. J. 976 (1959).
23 15 1l.2d 91, 154 N.E.2d 225 (1958).
24 19 ll1.2d 579, 169 N.E.2d 108 (1960).
25 19 1. 579, 586, 169 N.E.2d 108, 112 (1960).
2 6 Cf. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214
(1958).
27 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 101.65-2 (1959).
28 People v. Johns, 388 Ill. 212, 57 N.E.2d 895 (1944); People v. Hobbs, 352 I11. 224,
185 N.E. 610 (1933).
29 People v. Hobbs, supra note 28.
s People v. Reese, 355 M. 562, 189 N.E. 876 (1933).
81 People v. Barnes, 405 M. 30, 89 N.E.2d 791 (1950), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 944 (1950).
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
and hearing upon these motions must, in most cases, be included in a
properly certified bill of exceptions, for otherwise, the reviewing court
would not be able to determine whether the evidence introduced sup-
ported the contentions of the motion. What the rule does rectify is the
curious situation wherein the bill of exceptions contains the proceed-
ings upon a motion, but the motion itself is contained in the common-
law record. Under the old practice, the reviewing court could not
consider the correctness of the ruling upon the motion, for the motion
itself was not in the bill of exceptions.
The most recent change in criminal appellate procedure is the pro-
vision for review by appeal.8 2 Because of the greatly increased number
of criminal appeals occasioned by the promulgation of rule 65-1, the
Supreme Court has found it necessary to appoint for indigent prison-
ers many attorneys who are unfamiliar with the writ of error pro-
cedure. The court prevailed upon the Legislature to provide for appeal
by notice of appeal in order that the attorneys could use a more famil-
iar form of review. Unfortunately, the rule of the Supreme Court
which implemented the legislation, while setting forth a procedure
conforming to that used in civil appeals, did nothing to simplify that
procedure. The procedure upon the writ of error is, by far, simpler.
Under that procedure the defendant obtains his transcript of pro-
ceedings and procures its certification by the trial judge. He then re-
quests the clerk of the trial court to prepare the so-called common-law
record, which consists of the clerk's minutes, the pleadings, and other
papers filed in the cause. The clerk then combines the common-law
record with the certified transcript of proceedings and binds them to-
gether. The defendant sends this record to the clerk of the reviewing
court, who issues a writ of error and scire facias to hear errors. The
sheriff serves the scire facias.83 In practice, the clerk of the Supreme
Court procures the service of the scire facias, and when the transcript
of record is filed with the clerk of the reviewing court, the writ of
error is deemed returned. Thus, the only steps which the defendant
must take himself are procuring the record and sending it to the clerk
of the reviewing court. The practice in the Appellate Courts is slightly
more complex, because in those courts the plaintiff in error must draw
up the writ of error and scire facias and must also place the scire facias
with the sheriff of the proper county.
82 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 769.1 (1959); ILL. SuP. CT. R. 69-1, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110,
S 101.69-1 (1959).
83 ILL. Sup. Cr. R. 61,62,6, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §5 101.61,101.62, 101.6 (1959).
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It is hoped that eventually the court will follow the federal pro-
cedure employed in the Seventh Circuit, in which after the notice of
appeal is filed with the clerk of the District Court, all the original
papers and a copy of the docket entries are certified and sent to the clerk
of the reviewing court.3 4 The above concludes the summary of the
significant developments in criminal appellate procedure in this state
in the last decade.3 5
B. PROCEDURAL CHANGES TRACED THROUGH THE
PROGRESSION OF A CASE
The remainder of the developments in criminal procedure to be
discussed herein shall be treated in the order in which the problems
arise in a criminal case. In People v. Ferguson,6 the defendant, a judge
of the Municipal Court of Chicago, was indicted for conspiracy to
obstruct justice, to cheat and defraud the City of Chicago and the
County of Cook, and to extort money from motorists. He filed a "plea
in bar" which alleged that he was immune from prosecution because a
judge is so immune for acts committed by him while acting as judge,
and while acting honestly and in good faith. The trial court sustained
the motion. The State appealed. The court held that inasmuch as the
defendant did not allege any facts in his plea, but only conclusions of
law, the judge's motion was a motion to quash, from which the State
34 FED. R. CRIM. P. 37, 39; FED. R. Civ. P. 75 (o); 7TH CIR. R. 12 (e).
35 In a recent decision of some interest, the court seemed to set at rest the problem of
when a constitutional question is sufficiently present for purpose of giving the Supreme
Court jurisdiction in misdemeanor cases. In People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d
433 (1960), the court held that the provisions of the Civil Practice Act, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, §§ 1-4 (1959), rather than the Appellate Court Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 8
(1959), or the CRIMINAL CODE, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 7801 (1959), control the jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court in misdemeanor cases in which there is involved the
validity of a statute or a construction of the Constitution. The court went on to hold
that in the area of searches and seizures the boundaries of the protection afforded by
the Constitution cannot be determined by the declaration of one simple rule. Citing
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344 (1930), the court held that "the recurring questions of the reason-
ableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each case."
Id. at 17, 166 N.E.2d at 436. Thus, it would seem that whenever there is any constitu-
tional question involved in any misdemeanor case the defendant should seek review in
the Supreme Court, lest review by the Appellate Court be deemed a waiver of the con-
stitutional question. People v. Cosper, 5 Ill.2d 97, 125 N.E.2d 60 (1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 844 (1955); People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Barasch, 406 Ill. 253, 94 N.E.2d
148 (1950); People v. Richardson, 397 Ill. 84, 72 N.E.2d 851 (1947). The determination
of whether the question is debatable is one for the Supreme Court.
36 20 Ill.2d 295, 170 N.E.2d 171 (1960).
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could appeal. Furthermore, the court stated that pleas in bar are prop-
erly limited to the grounds available at common law, namely, autrefois
acquit, autrefois convict, and pardon. Although not mentioned by the
court specifically, it would seem that the situation wherein jeopardy
attaches without the case going to judgment could also be pleaded in
bar.3 7 Also, the court was silent as to the propriety of raising the im-
munity granted pursuant to immunity statutes.3 8 Equating such im-
munity with pardon would lead one to believe that a plea in bar could
be utilized in cases wherein immunity has been granted pursuant to
statute.
Turning now to double jeopardy itself, the decade past has seen
much activity in the field. In two cases decided in 1959, the Supreme
Court of the United States affirmed the dual sovereignty theory an-
nounced in United States v. Lanza.3 9 In Bartkus v. Illinois,40 the Court
held that the State of Illinois could prosecute for armed robbery a
person previously acquitted in the United States District Court of rob-
bery of a federally insured savings and loan association, where both
the state and federal indictments were based upon the same act of bank
robbery. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, after review-
ing the prior cases on the subject, said:
With this body of precedent as irrefutable evidence that state and federal
courts have for years refused to bar a second trial even though there had been
a prior trial by another government for a similar offense, it would be disre-
gard of a long, unbroken, unquestioned course of impressive adjudication for
the Court now to rule that due process compels such a bar.
41
However, he cautioned that:
... The greatest self-restraint is necessary when that federal system yields re-
sults with which a court is in little sympathy.
42
In a case argued and decided on the same days as the Bartkus case,
the Supreme Court of the United States decided the converse situa-
tion. In Abbate v. United States,48 the Court had before it the case of
two defendants who had been convicted in the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Mississippi of conspiracy to destroy
a means of communication operated or controlled by the United
37 See People v. Watson, 394 Ill. 177, 68 N.E.2d 265 (1946), cert. denied, 329 US.
769 (1946).
38 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 580a (1959). 41 Id. at 136.
39260 U.S. 377 (1922). 42ld. at 138.
40 359 U.S. 121 (1959). 43 359 U.S. 187 (1959).
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States. Previously they had been convicted in the Criminal Court of
Cook County of conspiracy to injure or destroy the property of the
Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company. The property of the
telephone company and the means of communication operated and
controlled by the United States were the same telephone facilities. The
Supreme Court upheld the conviction in the face of the claim of
double jeopardy, saying:
... [11f the States are free to prosecute criminal acts violating their laws, and
the resultant state prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based on the same
acts, federal law enforcement must necessarily be hindered .... But no one
would suggest that, in order to maintain the effectiveness of federal law en-
forcement, it is desirable completely to displace state power to prosecute
crimes based on acts which might also violate federal law. This would bring
about a marked change in the distribution of powers to administer criminal
justice, for the States under our federal system have the principal responsibil-
ity for defining and prosecuting crimes .... Thus, unless the federal authori-
ties could somehow insure that there would be no state prosecutions for par-
ticular acts that also constitute federal offenses, the efficiency of federal law
enforcement must suffer if the Double Jeopardy Clause prevents successive
state and federal prosecutions.44
To offset the evil effects of the Bartkus decision, the Legislature in
1959 enacted the following statute:
Whenever on the trial of an accused person for the violation of any criminal
law of this State it is shown that he has previously been tried and convicted
or acquitted under the laws of the Federal government, which former trial was
based on the act or omission for which he is being tried in this State, it is a
sufficient defense.45
In other decisions concerning double jeopardy and multiple prose-
cutions, the Supreme Court of the United States has held that a State
may, without violating due process, prosecute one defendant suc-
cessively for separate crimes arising out of the same transaction-such
as successive prosecutions for the robbery of each person robbed in a
single tavern hold-up, 46 and successive prosecutions for the murder of
each member of the defendant's family whom he killed in a single
course of action.47 The latter case affirmed a decision of the Supreme
Court of Illinois which held that the action of the prosecution did not
violate the double jeopardy provision of the state constitution.48
44 Id. at 195.
45 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 601.1 (1959).
46 Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958).
i Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958).
48 People v. Ciucci, 8 ll.2d 619, 137 N.E.2d 40 (1956).
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Attention will now be focused on other pre-trial matters. An act of
the 1957 Legislature provides a bar to the prosecution against a prisoner
in the penitentiary of all indictments or informations pending in the
county from which he was sentenced, unless he is brought to trial
within four months of imprisonment." This act also provides that the
bar shall not apply if the prisoner has caused the delay, and further,
that if the court is satisfied that the prosecution has exercised due dili-
gence to procure evidence and that such evidence, though not present-
ly available, may be procured at a later date, the cause may be con-
tinued not more than thirty days. The Illinois Supreme Court has ruled
that this statute does not have a retroactive effect.50 Presumably, al-
though the act is silent, the motion for discharge must be made prior to
conviction and in the same action as that from which the imprisoned
individual seeks relief."'
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the Second District, has ren-
dered a decision which clarifies the situation regarding the amendment
of an information. In People v. Moore,52 the court held that where an
information is so amended as to charge a different offense from that
originally charged, it must be reverified, for the verification of the
original information cannot be applied to the information as aniended.
The court further held that a defendant is not required to enter a plea
to an unverified information, and the plea entered to the original infor-
mation cannot be deemed to relate to the amended information. Fur-
ther, an amendment made after the evidence has been heard which
charges a different offense is material, and requires a reversal of a con-
viction based upon the amended information.
In People v. Hill,5 the Supreme Court of Illinois seemingly reversed
a long line of cases which have held that a trial in a case wherein there
is no showing that a formal plea of not guilty has been entered is a
nullity.5 4 Stating that such a rule is "out of keeping with the spirit that
has substituted, in criminal procedure as well as in civil, an interest in
49 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 633.1 (1959).
50 People v. Ross, 13 11.2d 11, 147 N.E.2d 309 (1958).
61 See People v. House, 10 11.2d 556, 141 N.E.2d 12 (1957); People v. Utterback,
385 Ill. 239, 52 N.E.2d 775 (1944).
52 21111. App.2d 9, 157 N.E.2d 94 (1959).
53 17 I11.2d 112, 160 N.E.2d 779 (1959).
54 Johnson v. People, 22 111. 314 (1859); Yundt v. People, 65 111. 372 (1872); Parkin-
son v. People, 135 Ill. 401, 25 N.E. 764 (1890); People v. Evenow, 355 Ill. 451, 189
N.E. 368 (1934); People v. Shoffner, 400 Ill. 174, 79 N.E.2d 200 (1948).
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the significant rights of the litigants for a ritualistic concern with
empty formalities," 5 the court went on to hold that it must "look to
the record to determine whether or not the omission of a formal plea
adversely affected the rights of the defendant, ' 15 and if not, the con-
viction could not be set aside for that reason. This case overrules some
of the authorities upon which the Appellate Court based its decision
in the Moore case. Nevertheless, the Moore case must still stand for the
proposition that an unverified information is a nullity, and that an in-
formation cannot be amended to conform to the proof in such a man-
ner as to charge a new crime.
An amendment to the CRIMINAL CODE enacted in 195 557 permits trial
of felonies by information if the defendant, after being informed of
his right to indictment by grand jury, formally waives indictment in
open court. The constitutionality of this statute was passed upon in
People v. Bradley,5" which held that inasmuch as nothing in the
statute abolishes the grand jury, it does not violate the constitution of
this state.5 Nor, according to the Bradley case, does the statute violate
the due process provision of the Constitution of the United States in
any manner.60
The Supreme Court in People v. Spegal,6' decided that the right to
trial by jury is one personal to the defendant and one which he can
waive at his pleasure. Therefore, it was error for the trial court to have
granted the prosecution a jury trial upon its request. This case specif-
ically overruled People v. Scornavache2 and People v. Scott 6 3
One further change in pre-trial criminal procedure of some note
was made by a statute enacted in 1953. It was provided therein that
a defendant in a criminal case could raise by a preliminary motion,
questions concerning the competency of a confession taken from
him. 4
55 People v. Hill, 17 Ill.2d 112, 119, 160 N.E.2d 779, 783 (1959).
56 Id. at 120, 160 N.E.2d at 783.
57 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 702 (1959).
58 7 Ill.2d 619, 131 N.E.2d 538 (1956), Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 832 (1957).
59 ILL. CONsT. art. II, § 8. This section, while guaranteeing the right to indictment by
grand jury, carries the provision that the Legislature may abolish the grand jury in all
cases.
60 Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
615 1ll.2d 211, 125 N.E.2d 468 (1955).
62 347 Ill. 403, 179 N.E. 909 (1931), Annot., 79 A.L.R. 553 (1932).
03 383 111. 122, 48 N.E.2d 530 (1943).
64 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 736.1 (1959).
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Although there is no intention to consider in this article the develop-
ments in the law of criminal evidence, one statute should be noted. In
1959, the Legislature enacted a statute which prohibits the court from
requiring, requesting, or suggesting that the defendant submit to a lie
test or to questioning under the effect of sodium pentothal or other
questioning by means of any mechanical device or chemical sub-
stance.65 This statute supplements existing case law which prohibits
the admission of the results of lie detector tests in evidence 6 6 and it
prevents the possible forcing of admissions or confessions by judges by
means of such devices.
During the last decade the Supreme Court decided two cases in-
volving the selection of veniremen under the Jury Commissioners
Act 67 and the Jurors Act 8 in criminal cases. In People v. Siciliano,19
during the course of the voir dire examination of the jury, the regular
panel of jurors became exhausted, and the trial court, following the
provisions of section 13 of the Jurors Act,7° ordered the sheriff to sum-
mon additional persons to serve as prospective jurors. When this was
discovered by the defendant, he moved to challenge the array of the
additional jurors so summoned on the grounds that their names had not
been drawn in the manner provided for by the Jury Commissioners
Act.7' The Supreme Court held that the Jury Commissioners Act,
while it supplements the Jurors Act, is not amendatory of the earlier
statute. Therefore, when it appears that the panel of jurors has become
exhausted during trial, the court may order the sheriff to summon
jurors without regard to the jury commissioner lists.
Approximately two years later, the court had before it a second case
involving almost identical circumstances. In People v. Bedard,72 the
regular panel of jurors had become exhausted prior to trial because
other trials before other judges of the court had depleted the panel.
One of the judges of the court issued a special venire directed to the
sheriff to summon jurors. Again the defendant, when the fact became
known to him, challenged the array because it had not been selected in
65 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 736.2 (1959).
66 People v. Forte, 279 N.Y. 204, 18 N.E.2d 31 (1938).
67 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, §5 24-35 (1959).
68 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, §§ 1-15 (1959).
69 4 I11.2d 581, 123 N.E.2d 725 (1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 931 (1955).
70ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, § 13 (1959).
71 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 78, S 32 (1959).
72 11 I11.2d 622, 145 N.E.2d 54 (1957).
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accordance with the Jury Commissioners Act, which act was in force
and effect in the county wherein the case was being tried. This time
the Supreme Court held that the challenge to the array should have
been allowed. The court held that section 13 of the Jurors Act applies
only when the panel becomes exhausted during the trial; when the panel
becomes exhausted prior to trial the names of the jurors must be drawn
from the jury commissioners' lists in the manner provided by the Jury
Commissioners Act. Moreover, the court also cautioned against the
practice of summoning jurors in a criminal case in accordance with
section 13 of the Jurors Act even when the panel does become exhausted
during trial.73 Further, the court held that the defendant had been
entitled to have a special bailiff appointed to summon the special venire,
as is provided in the Jurors Act. 74
One last change in the criminal procedure as it regards jurors re-
sulted from the promulgation, by the Supreme Court, of rule 24-1. 75
Under this rule the trial judge exercises greater control over the voir
dire examination of the prospective jurors, and the parties are barred
from discussing questions of law with the jurors. Although there was
some concern, especially among defense lawyers, that the new rule
would hinder the parties in their attempt to obtain a fair and impartial
jury, this has not proved to be the case in actual practice. However,
the rule has not seemed to lessen the time needed for the selection of
the jury, as it was intended to do.
Except for the discovery procedures treated above, there have been
no significant changes in criminal trial practice.78
73 Among the reasons for this cautionary statement was the fact that in the Bedard
case the jurors summoned by the sheriff were a former assistant sheriff who had
served under the sheriff for three years, a woman who had known the sheriff for many
years, a man who had been a former grand juror and who was intimately acquainted
with the State's Attorney, a man whose son-in-law was a deputy sheriff, and a man who
had known the sheriff for fifty years and had served as a juror forty or fifty times.
74 Citing Healey v. People, 177 Ill. 306, 52 N.E. 426 (1898).
75 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 101.24-1 (1959).
70 One minor change was effected by the amendment of § 67 of the Civil Practice
Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 67 (1959), concerning jury instructions, which is made
applicable to criminal cases by virtue of Supreme Court rule 25, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110,
§ 101.25 (1959). Under this section of the Practice Act, as it was amended in 1955, a copy
of proposed instructions must be served upon counsel for the opposing party, there
must be a conference among the judge and counsel for the parties, the court must
inform the parties of the instructions which he would give prior to argument, and all
objections must be made at the conference which must be preserved in the bill of
exceptions, in order for the reviewing court to pass upon the question of the instruc-
tions.
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Post-trial procedure has seen some changes which are or might provc
to be significant. In People v. Flynn,77 the Supreme Court overruled
prior authority 78 and held that the statutory provision that motions
for new trial and in arrest of judgment must be in writing7 9 are direc-
tory and not mandatory. Therefore, said the court:
It is undoubtedly a better practice to specify the grounds in writing and
preserve them in the bill of exceptions. The opposite party, or the trial court
on its own motion, may compel this to be done. But there seems to be no
good reason why the requirement of writing may not be waived. In the case
at bar there is nothing to indicate that either the prosecutor or the court called
on defendants to specify in writing the points on which they based their mo-
tion, and the State must therefore be held to have waived such requirement."0
Thus, any ground for a new trial or in arrest of judgment or for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict which could have been presented
is deemed presented by an oral motion not objected to by court or
counsel, and may be assigned as error upon review."
Acts of the 1953 Legislature rectified a curious situation wherein a
judge without a jury hearing cases upon a plea of not guilty of mis-
prision of treason, murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape or kidnapping
could not hear evidence in aggravation or mitigation. 2 This situation
was caused by the fact that the last-mentioned crimes are punishable
by definite sentences rather than indeterminate sentences, and in jury
trials definite sentences must be set by the jury. The former statute,
which contemplated trial by jury only, did not make any provisions
for the presentation of evidence in aggravation or mitigation other
than that which would be competent as proof of guilt or innocence.
When trials by the court alone became permissible,8 3 the statute was
not changed to allow a hearing in aggravation and mitigation in non-
jury trials. Since 1953, a court hearing one of the above types of cases
upon a plea of not guilty has been given authority to hear evidence in
aggravation and mitigation upon a finding of guilty.8 4
In another development in the matter of sentencing, the court de-
77 8 Ill.2d 116, 133 N.E.2d 257 (1956).
78 People v. Jankowski, 391 111. 298, 63 NE.2d 362 (1945).
79 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 747 (1959).
80 People v. Flynn, 8 I1l.2d 116, 119, 133 N.E.2d 257, 258-59 (1956).
81 People v. Prohaska, 8 III.2d 579, 134 N.E.2d 799 (1956).
82 People v. Trobiani, 412 I11. 235, 106 N.E.2d 367 (1952).
83 People ex rel. Swanson v. Fisher, 340 111. 250, 172 N.E. 722 (1930).
84 ILL, REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 732, 801 (1959).
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cided that a sentence, purporting to be indeterminate, of a minimum
of life imprisonment and a maximum of life imprisonment was a definite
sentence, and was therefore not permitted by the Sentence and Parole
Act to be given for armed robbery, a crime for which the act requires
an indeterminate sentence s5
The greatest change in sentencing procedure during the period
1950-1960 was the enactment of the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act",
in 1957. In essence, this statute has abolished the old practice wherein
the second offender was indicted as a habitual criminal, his record intro-
duced in evidence as proof of the prior offense, and upon conviction
of the crime and the finding that he had been convicted of one of the
prior crimes enumerated in the statute, he was mandatorily sentenced
to the full term provided for by law for the second crime. Thus, after
a first conviction for grand larceny and a subsequent conviction for
burglary the defendant would have to be sentenced to life imprison-
ment, the maximum sentence for burglary. An anomaly of this situation
was that if the first crime had been burglary and the second grand
larceny, the defendant could have been sentenced only to ten years
imprisonment, the maximum for the crime of grand larceny. Under
the new practice, the defendant is merely indicted for the second
offense, without any mention of the prior offense. The jury is not
informed of his record and no finding by the jury is necessary. Only
after conviction is the petition reciting the fact of the prior offense-
which may be any felony-presented to the judge. If the judge finds
that the defendant has been previously convicted of any felony, he
then makes the finding that the defendant is a habitual criminal, where-
upon he may sentence the defendant to such term as is provided by
law for the crime of which the defendant was subsequently convicted.
If the term of imprisonment for the crime is less than twenty years,
the court may sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment of
twenty years or twice the maximum sentence provided by law, which-
ever is less. In addition, the new statute regulates the parole of prisoners
sentenced as habitual criminals.87
85 People v. Westbrook, 411 111. 301, 103 N.E.2d 494 (1952); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 802 (1959).
86 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 603.1-.9 (1959).
87 An excellent and comprehensive study of the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act
will be found in UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, LAW SCHOOL, LAW REVISION RESEARCH SERIES,
No. 1, DUNHAM & MERRIFIELD, LAW REVISION STUDIES, DRAFT OF A PROPOSED ILLINOIS
HABITUAL CRIMINAL AC.... (1955).
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No further significant changes have taken place in the years under
consideration in the areas of sentence, probation, 8 or parole; however,
the revision of the Civil Practice Act in 1955 has presented some as
yet unresolved questions concerning proceedings for relief from judg-
ment. 9 Historically, relief from judgment in criminal cases after the
expiration of term time has been by the writ of error coram nobis.90
In 1933, the writ of error coram nobis was abolished and a motion was
substituted in its place." Nevertheless, under this change the only
grounds for relief which were available under the motion were those
which were available under the writ of error coram nobis.92 Relief
under coram nobis was available only where the conviction was ob-
tained by duress or fraud, or where by some excusable mistake or
ignorance of the accused, or without negligence on his part, he had
been deprived of a defense which he could have used at his trial, and
which, if known by the court, would have prevented conviction.13
The 1955 amendment to section 72 of the Civil Practice Act 4
abolished not only coram nobis but also coram vobis, writs of audita
querela, bills of review, and bills in the nature of bills of review. The
act further provides:
... All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds for said relief heretofore
available, either at law or in equity, whether by any of the foregoing reme-
dies or otherwise, shall be available in every case, by proceedings hereunder,
regardless of the nature of the order, judgment or decree from which relief is
sought or of the proceedings in which it was entered. There shall be no dis-
tinction among actions at law, suits in equity and other proceedings, statutory
or otherwise, as to availability of relief, grounds for relief or the relief ob-
tainable. 95
The full portent of this statute as it regards criminal cases is not yet
clear. But it would seem that many new grounds for relief from
88 For an excellent study of the rights of a probationer in a proceeding for revoca-
tion of probation see People v. Price, 23 111. App.2d 364, 164 N.E.2d 528 (1960).
89 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 5 72 (1959).
90 See People v. Crooks, 326 Ill. 266, 157 N.E. 218 (1927).
91 Ill. Laws 1933, at 804-05.
92 People ex rel. Courtney v. Green, 355 Ill. 468, 189 N.E. 500 (1934). But cf. Ellman
v. De Ruiter, 412 11. 285, 106 N.E.2d 350 (1952), wherein the court applied equitable
principles in administering relief.
93 People ex rel. Courtney v. Green, 355 Ill. 468, 189 N.E. 500 (1934).
94 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, S 72 (1959).
95 Ibid.
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judgment may become available in criminal cases.96 This field is at
present too problematic to even attempt to say more in an article
such as this.
No article on criminal procedure would be complete without some
allusion to criminal jurisdiction and venue. The clarification of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme and Appellate Courts as it concerns
constitutional questions has already been discussed.97 The greatest
change in criminal jurisdiction involves justices of the peace and
police magistrates. By act of the Legislature in 1955 the jurisdiction
of justices of the peace and police magistrates was increased to cover
all crimes wherein punishment does not exceed one year imprison-
ment in the county jail and a fine of not more than five hundred
dollars.98 The result of this change has been to relieve the Criminal
Court of Cook County and the circuit and county courts from a
great load of minor cases which would have had to be tried in courts
of record under the former statutes, which limited the jurisdiction of
justices of the peace and police magistrates to only those crimes pun-
ishable by fine not exceeding three hundred dollars. 99
There have been no significant changes in the law as it regards the
venue of the court, but the Supreme Court has restricted the proce-
96 For example, it has been a long-stated rule that perjury-even admitted perjury-
is not a basis for review under coram nobis. People v. Drysch, 311 Ill. 342, 143 N.E.
100 (1924). Nevertheless, there is authority in this state to the effect that equity will
grant relief from a judgment where that judgment has been procured by means of
perjury. Seward v. Cease, 50 Ill. 228 (1869); Nicoloff v. Schnipper, 233 II. App. 591
(1924). It has been held that relief by way of coram nobis will not lie based upon
newly discovered evidence. People v. Sheppard, 405 111. 79, 90 N.E.2d 78 (1950); never-
theless, it has been held that a court of equity will set aside a judgment at law because
of newly discovered evidence, provided that there was no lack of diligence in failing
to discover the evidence sooner, and further provided that the evidence is material
and woud have produced a different result. Crane Co. v. Parker, 304 IIl. 331, 136 N.E.
733 (1922). The equitable relief mentioned above is sometimes in the form of an
injunction restraining the execution of judgment, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 69, § 4 (1959);
but see City of Chicago v. Chicago City Ry., 222 I1. 560, 78 N.E. 890 (1906), or the
grant of a new trial, Crane Co. v. Parker, supra, Brown v. Luehrs, 95 Ill. 195 (1880).
In addition to the remedy to equitable relief from judgment, which should not be con-
fused with the relief obtainable under a bill of review or a bill in the nature of a bill
of review, there is the possibility that the grounds for relief and the relief obtainable
under the latter two proceedings, while in some respects similar to coram nobis, may
be sufficiently different so as to give the convicted person additional means of relief.
97 See generally supra note 35.
9 8 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 79, § 165 (1959).
99 1 111. Laws 1943, at 844.
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
dures of taking changes of venue from the judge. 0 In People v.
Chambers'' and People v. Wilfong,102 the court reaffirmed its position
that a petition for change of venue from the judge because of his
prejudice, is untimely when it is presented after the judge has ruled
upon preliminary motions, such as motions to quash the indictment
or information, or motions to suppress evidence, even when the de-
fendant did not obtain knowledge of the prejudice until after the
motions had been heard and determined. In addition, the court said
in the Chambers case:
Although we do not believe that the circumstances herein warrant any such
inference [that the defendant was endeavoring to prevent a trial before any
judge], nevertheless we cannot give approbation to the apparent delaying tac-
tics involved in the eleven continuances, extending over a period of more than
a year, and in the fact that the defendant did not move to suppress the evi-
dence until the day the case was finally set for trial and called even though
that motion was predicated on facts known to him from the date of the in-
dictment and could have been made at any time prior to the trial.' 03
Thus notice was served that the court would look long and hard
at petitions for changes of venue from the judge to determine whether
or not they are merely subterfuges for gaining further delay of trial.
Nevertheless, three cases in which changes of venue were denied in
the trial courts were reversed upon review for such denial. People v.
Goss,10 4 was reversed when the trial court in a contempt case refused
to grant a change of venue because the defendant had sought to get
certain politicians to prevail upon the judge to transfer the matter to
another judge for hearing, the Supreme Court saying:
From the record it appears that ... this proceeding had bizarre aspects that
made it unusually difficult for the trial judge to perform his task. But we are
of the opinion that the judge's appraisal of the circumstances of this particular
case should not have overridden the statutory provisions for a change of
venue.'05
In reversing People v. Gregory,106 the Appellate Court of Illinois
for the Second District held that a petition presented on the day set
100 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 146, § 18-35 (1959).
1019 Ill.2d 83, 136 N.E.2d 812 (1956).
102 17 11.2d 373, 162 N.E.2d 256 (1959).
103 People v. Chambers, 9 Ill.2d 83, 91-92, 136 N.E.2d 812, 816 (1956).
104 10 ll.2d 533, 141 N.E.2d 385 (1957).
105 Id. at 548, 141 N.E.2d at 392.
106 16 Ill. App.2d 576, 149 N.E.2d 198 (1958).
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for trial was timely where the act which was the basis for the infor-
mation was alleged to have occurred on February 23, 1955, and the
cause was first set for hearing on March 1, 1955, and then continued
from time to time until June 9, 1955-the date upon which the petition
for change of venue was presented. The court reiterated the law on
the subject:
In a criminal case when a defendant in apt time brings himself within the
terms of the statute, the trial judge has no discretion as to whether or not a
change of venue will be granted. He must allow it as a matter of right. He
cannot question the truthfulness or the good faith of the charge of prejudice.
It is not for the judge to determine whether or not he entertains prejudice
against the defendant, it is for the defendant to determine whether or not he
believes that the judge is prejudiced. When the statute has been complied with
the trial judge loses all power and authority over the case, except to make the
necessary orders to effectuate a change of venue.107
The last case on this subject is of special importance because it
concerns a situation wherein there was no statutory right of the de-
fendant for a change of venue. In People ex rel. Przyblinski v. Scott,0 s
the defendants had been cited for contempt under the Election
Code.'09 When the defendants, judges of election, first appeared be-
fore the trial judge, the county judge of Cook County, he said to
them, as it is reported:
You cause criticism of our ability to run an honest election. You make me
bow my head in shame. I was elected to do a job and I am doing the very best
I can. I have to depend on persons I do not know to help me and you have let
me down.... You have committed a serious offense. 110
This, before trial had even commenced. The defendants promptly
filed a petition for a change of venue; in denying it the judge said:
I am not prejudging this matter nor have I found the respondents guilty. It
may be that I may find the respondents not guilty."'
The Appellate Court of Illinois for the First District reversed the
conviction, and in doing so stated:
107 Id. at 582, 149 N.E.2d at 201.
108 23 111. App.2d 167, 161 N.E.2d 705 (1958), aff'd, 19 111.2d 500, 167 N.E.2d 194
(1960).
109 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 46, S 29-5 (1957).
110 People ex rel. Przyblinski v. Scott, 23 111. App.2d 167, 169, 161 N.E.2d 705, 706
(1958).
111 Ibid.
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A fair trial under due process of law requires an impartial judge free from
personal conviction as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. . . . The re-
spondents were entitled to a trial before a judge who had not formed an opin-
ion as to their guilt. The statement of the trial judge at the time the respond-
ents were arraigned before him indicates that he had formed an opinion as to
their guilt.11
2
It is difficult to make any general observations about a field as
broad as criminal procedure. It can be said, however, that the changes
and the developments in this area have, without exception, been for
the purpose of assuring the defendant and the prosecution a fair trial
upon the merits of the case. The older hypertechnical rules are dis-
appearing. In their place we find a body of law which, as was said by
Mr. Chief Justice Schaefer, "has substituted . . . an interest in the
significant rights of the litigants for a ritualistic concern with empty
formalities. ' 113
112 Id. at 170, 161 N.E.2d at 706-07.
113 People v. Hill, 17 Ill.2d 112, 119,160 N.E.2d 779, 783 (1959).
PART II
CHANGES IN SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
A. STATUTORY CHANGES
The single most important statutory change in the substantive law
of crimes during the past decade should, perhaps, not even be con-
sidered a substantive change. The replacement, in 1955, of the Sexual
Psychopath Act,1 by the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act2 was de-
signed to provide "a means by which it may be determined whether a
defendant's mental condition is such as to require him to plead to an
indictment and be placed upon trial for the crime with which he is
charged."' Under both acts the trial on the question of mental dis-
order4 is no part of the prior criminal proceedings and is not deter-
minative of guilt or innocence.5 And, under the old statute, at least,
1 11. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1938, at 28.
2 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 820.01 (1959).
3 People v. Capoldi, 10 Ill.2d 261, 265, 139 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1957).
4 The term "mental disorder" used in the act obviously implies something other
than insanity. Section 13 of division II of the CiuMiNAL CODE provides for a jury trial
on the merits where it appears that a person has become insane since the commission
of an offense. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 593 (1959). See text accompanying infra notes
169-173.
5 People v. Capoldi, 10 Ill.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d 776 (1957); People v. Redlich, 402 Ill.
270, 83 N.E.2d 736 (1949).
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commitment as a sexual psychopath was not a bar to the trial of the
defendant for the offenses charged.8 These features would seem to
suggest that the statutes were and are substantially procedural in
nature. Nevertheless, because of the fact that a petition under the act
is apt to involve a denial of liberty, the practical effect of the statute is
to provide new substantive law.
There are two substantial differences between the old statute and
the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. Section 1 of the new act 7 defines
as sexually dangerous those persons who suffer from a mental disorder
which has existed for over a year, coupled with propensities to com-
mit sex offenses, "and who have demonstrated propensities toward acts
of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children.",, Under the
old act, it was unnecessary that the person charged have demonstrated
any propensities toward sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of
children It was merely necessary that he have criminal propensities to
the commission of sex offenses. Thus it would appear, although no case
has litigated the question, that under the old act a consensual sexual
offense could serve as the basis for a proceeding under the act, while
under the new act it would seem that a sexual crime of violence would
be necessary.
Of greater importance, however, is the present provision furnishing
appellate review of a determination under the act."0 Under the former
6 People v. Elder, 345 Ill. App. 607, 104 N.E.2d 120 (1952); see People ex rel. Turn-
baugh v. Bibb, 252 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1958). Section 6 of the former act contained
the express provision that the order discharging a person confined under the act from
the custody of the Department of Public Safety shall also commit that person to the
custody of the sheriff of the county from which he was committed "to stand trial for
the criminal offense charged against such person." Ill. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1938, at
30, as amended by Ill. Laws 1941, at 551. It may be, however, that such prosecution will
be barred if not brought within four months.
A conviction for the offense which forms the basis for a petition under the act voids
all orders entered upon the petition. People v. Redlich, 402 IM. 270, 83 N.E.2d 736 (1949).
7 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 820.01 (1959).
8 Ibid.
9 Ill. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1938, at 28.
10 "The proceedings under this Act shall be civil in nature. The provisions of the
Civil Practice Act including the provisions for appeal ... shall apply to all proceedings
hereunder except as otherwise provided in this Act." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 822.01
(1959). Since the provisions of the Civil Practice Act pertaining to appeal do apply,
an appeal from an order entered under this act should be taken to the Appellate Court,
unless a fairly debatable constitutional question is presented by the appeal. People v.
Capoldi, 10 Ill.2d 261, 139 N.E.2d 776 (1957).
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act no appellate review was possible." But the inclusion of a provision
that proceedings under the act are to be civil in nature and that the
provisions of the Civil Practice Act 2 are to apply to all such proceed-
ings" has caused some problems. In People v. Nastasio,4 the appellant
had been indicted for a number of sex offenses. The State's Attorney
filed a petition 5 under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act alleging
that the defendant was a sexually dangerous person within the mean-
ing of the act and praying for a hearing to determine the issue. The
defendant demanded trial by a jury,' which jury found that he was a
sexually dangerous person. The defendant was committed to the cus-
tody of the Director of Public Safety for confinement and treatment.' 7
11 See People v. Ross, 407 Ill. 199, 95 N.E.2d 61 (1950), wherein the Supreme Court
held that because appellate review was not provided by the act, no appeal or writ of
error would lie directly to the Supreme Court. Where the validity of a statute is in
question the court can and will take jurisdition. See People v. Sims, 382 111. 472, 47
N.E.2d 703 (1943), upholding the constitutionality of the Criminal Sexual Psychopath
Act. See also infra note 186, discussing appellate review of sanity hearings. Follow-
ing its discussion of when the court would take jurisdiction of a direct appeal in a
case of this sort, the court transferred the case to the Appellate Court. People v.
Ross, supra.
The Appellate Court for the Second District, People v. Ross, 344 111. App. 407, 101
N.E.2d 112 (1951), decided, however, that because of the absence of a provision in
the statute providing for appellate review, it, too, lacked jurisdiction to review the case.
12 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §S 1-94 (1959).
13 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 822.01 (1959).
14 19 Ill.2d 524, 168 N.E.2d 728 (1960).
15 "When any person is charged with a criminal offense and it shall appear to the
Attorney General or to the State's Attorney of the county wherein such person is so
charged, that such person is a sexually dangerous person, within the meaning of this
Act, then the Attorney General or State's Attorney of such county may file with the
clerk of the court in the same proceeding wherein such person stands charged with
criminal offense, a petition in writing setting forth facts tending to show that the
person named is a sexually dangerous person." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 822 (1959).
10 The new act specifically provides that "the respondent in any proceedings under
this Act shall have the right to demand a trial by jury and to be represented by coun-
sel." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 824 (1959). The former act contained a provision en-
titling the respondent to a hearing before a jury to ascertain "whether or not the per-
son charged is a criminal sexual psychopathic person." Ill. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1938,
at 29, as amended by Ill. Laws 1941, at 551. It did not, however, specifically provide
that the respondent had the right to be represented by counsel. Nevertheless, it would
be hard to imagine that under the former act a respondent could be denied the right to
be represented by counsel. Cf. People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill.2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 100 (1959).
17 The section providing that the Director of Public Safety "shall provide care and
treatment for the person committed to him designed to effect recovery," is new. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 825a (1959). The former act merely provided for commitment.
Ill. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1938, at 28, as amended by Ill. Laws 1941, at 551.
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Appealing directly to the Supreme Court,'" the defendant claimed that
the admission in evidence of two depositions which had been taken in
his absence violated his constitutional right "to appear and defend in
person and ... to meet the witnesses face to face ..."19
It was not necessary, however, for the court to reach the constitu-
tional question.20 The court reasoned that despite the fact that section
3.01 of the act 2 ' provided that the provisions of the Civil Practice Act
were to apply in proceedings under the act, those proceedings were
essentially criminal in nature; and, in order "to interpret the statute as
to promote its essential purposes and to avoid, if possible, a construc-
tion that would raise doubts as to its [constitutional] validity,' 22 the
court held that ". . while the general structure of the Civil Practice Act
has been adopted, the use of depositions taken out of the presence of
the defendant has not been authorized. 23
The other changes in the act have not, to this date, been litigated,
and do not, as yet, seem to be of as much significance as the changes
discussed above. Section 4 of the old act, 24 providing for an examina-
tion by two psychiatrists, also provided that the psychiatrists should
file with the court, in addition to their reports, their conclusions and
recommendations. A section of the new act' 5 omits the provision that
the psychiatrists shall include with their reports their conclusions and
recommendations, and provides that a copy of the reports shall be de-
livered to the respondent. This new provision is in substantial con-
18 Under the Civil Practice Act the respondent's appeal normally would have been
directed to the Appellate Court of the district from which he was committed. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 75 (1959). Because of the fact that the respondent raised a fairly
debatable constitutional question, appeal lay directly to the Supreme Court. Compare
People v. Watkins, 19 1.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960), and supra note 35, Part I, of this
article.
19 ILL. CONST. art II, S 9.
20 The fact that the court decides the issues on other than the constitutional grounds
presented or argued does not defeat its jurisdiction, City of Detroit v. Gould, 12 Ill.2d
297, 146 N.E.2d 61 (1957); People v. Metcoff, 392 Ill. 418, 64 N..2d 867 (1946), for
the court will not consider a constitutional question if the case can be decided without
so doing, People v. Chiafreddo, 381 Il. 214, 44 N.E.2d 888 (1942).
21 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 822.01 (1959).
22 People v. Nastasio, 19 Ill.2d 524, 529, 168 N.E.2d 728, 731 (1960).
23 Ibid. Note, however, the use of the qualifying words "out of the presence of the
defendant."
24 Ill. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1938, at 28.
"5 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 823 (1959).
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formity with other sections of the CRIMINAL CODE. 20 Of some note are
the changes in release provisions. Under the former act release could
only be obtained by a showing, to a jury, that the patient had perma-
nently and fully recovered. Under the new act provision is made for
the conditional release, upon the petition of the Director of the De-
partment of Public Safety, of the patient.28 Also eliminated is the re-
quirement of the old act that upon release the patient is to be com-
mitted to the custody of the sheriff of the county from which he was
committed to stand trial for the offense with which he was charged
prior to his commitment. 29
Although not technically part of the Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act, a 1957 act of the Legislature is related thereto; it provides for a
mandatory psychiatric examination of all persons of the age of seven-
teen or over who are charged with any sexual crime against a child
under the age of thirteen. 0 The act is apparently meant to be a preli-
20 See text accompanying supra notes 1-3, Part I, of this article.
27 Both SS 5 and 6 of the former act indicated this. Section 5 provided that the De-
partment of Public Safety should keep a person committed "until such person shall
have fully and permanently recovered from such psychopathy." Section 6 provided
that the jury hearing the application for discharge shall "ascertain whether or not such
person has fully recovered from such psychopathy." Ill. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1938, at
28, as amended by Ill. Laws 1941, at 551. (Emphasis added.) For the problems implicit
in the use of these terms, see People v. Kadens, 399 Ill. 394, 78 N.E.2d 289 (1948),
wherein the court held, in construing identical terms contained in 1 Ill. Laws 1947,
at 585, that ". . . the words refer to the present time; that 'permanently' does not mean
an absolute condition for all future time, but only that the condition to be found was
full and permanent recovery at the present time, and that such condition was rea-
sonably certain to continue. It is elementary that all law must be based on reason and
to construe these words to mean absolute as to the future would be placing thereon an
unreasonable construction." Id. at 400, 78 N.E.2d at 292.
28 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, SS 825b, 825c (1959). The new act eliminates the use of the
terms "fully" and "permanently" recovered, and provides that "if the patient is found
to have recovered [upon the application for discharge] the Court shall order that he be
discharged." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 825b (1959).
Section 825c provides for a conditional release order permitting a patient "to go at
large subject to such conditions and supervision by the Director as in the opinion of
the court will adequately protect the public. In the event the person violates any of
the conditions of such order, the court shall revoke such conditional release and re-
commit the person under the terms of the original commitment." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 825c (1959).
29 Ill. Laws Ist Spec. Sess. 1938, at 28, as amended by Ill. Laws 1941, at 551. The
elimination of this provision from the present act strengthens the suspicion that com-
mitment under the act may be a bar to the criminal proceedings which were the basis
for the hearing under the act. See text accompanying supra note 5.
30 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 825f, 8 25g, 825h, 825i (1959).
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minary step to the trial of these persons.8' Because of the possible con-
flict between this act and the constitutional proscription against self-
incrimination, 2 its constitutional validity is now being tested.83
Although the foregoing statutory provisions enacted during the
1950's may be considered procedural because of the fact that they con-
cern steps to be taken by the proper authorities prior to, or in lieu of,
trial, they do represent the bulk of important substantive legislation
enacted during the past decade. Very little was done in the way of
enacting newer crimes as such. It must, of course, be realized that a
great many crimes, or acts or omissions which are considered offenses
against the People of the State of Illinois, are not found in chapter 38
of the Revised Statutes. These are most often the administrative crimes
founded upon some other duty imposed by the statutes.3 4 Changes in
these provisions are not intended to fall within the scope of this review.
'Prior to 1951, simple assault and battery in Illinois was punishable
only by a fine. In 1951, however, the Legislature added a provision
providing for the punishment and incarceration of persons found
guilty of aggravated assault and battery." Aggravated assault and bat-
tery is defined by this provision as the "unlawful and violent beating of
another which results in severe personal injury." The phrase implies an
injury of far more serious nature than that implied by an ordinary bat-
tery. 6 Punishment for aggravated assault and battery is set at one year
imprisonment in the county jail, or a fine, or both.3 Generally speak-
ing the new offense may be considered to fall somewhere between
simple assault, or assault and battery," and mayhem,39 or assault with
intent to commit a felony.40
31 Note that the act provides that trial shall be in a court of record. ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, § 825f (1959).
32 ILL. CONsT. art. II, § 10.
33 People v. Ulrich, No. 36343, 111. Sup. Ct., May Term, 1961.
34 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 806 (1959).
35 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 562, 57 (1959).
30See People v. Cavanaugh, 18 111. App.2d 279, 152 N.E.2d 266 (1957), aff'd, 13
Il.2d 491, 150 N.E.2d 592 (1958).
37 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 57 (1959).
38 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 55, 56 (1959).
39 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 448 (1959).
4 0 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 58 (1959). By ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 57 (1959), the law
was also changed during the 1950's to increase the penalty for assault with intent to
commit murder from one to fourteen years, to one to twenty years.
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In 1941, the Supreme Court held that a defendant who was indicted
for burglary could not be found guilty of attempted burglary4" by
application of the general rule that "when an indictment for a higher
crime embraces all the elements of an offense of an inferior degree the
jury may discharge the accused of the higher crime and convict him of
the lower if the evidence justifies it .... This principle did not apply
in the case referred to because the statute defining attempted burglary
at that time43 contained the added element, not found in the burglary
statute, that the attempted burglary be committed in the nighttime.
Nor did the general attempt statute44 apply.45 In People v. Lebolt,46
however, the court decided that an indictment charging an attempt to
commit burglary in the daytime could be founded upon the general
attempt statute, since the specific statute provided for attempts to com-
mit burglary at night, but it did not refer to attempts made in the day-
time. In 1953, the Legislature removed the cause of this confusion by
amending the statute pertaining to attempted burglary. The new
statute omits any reference as to when the attempt must be made, thus
bringing it into harmony with the burglary statute.
The entire structure of the laws relating to drugs and narcotics un-
derwent a substantial revision in the 1950's. Sections 184 to 18 6g of
chapter 38 were repealed in 1959 and replaced with the "Uniform
41 People v. Glickman, 377 Ill. 360, 36 N.E.2d 720 (1941). At that time j 85 of ch. 38
provided: "Whosoever shall attempt to break and enter in the night time ... shall be
imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than one nor more than five years." (Emphasis
added.) Ill. Laws 1874, at 348.
42 People v. Lewis, 375 Ill. 330, 335, 31 N.E.2d 795, 798 (1940), and cases cited there-
in. But an attempt to commit a crime and the commission of a crime are separate and
distinct offenses, People v. Crane, 302 Ill. 217, 134 N.E. 99 (1922), and require different
elements of proof, People v. Lardner, 300 Ill. 264, 133 N.E. 375 (1921). It would be diffi-
cult to imagine, therefore, how an attempt could be a lesser included offense.
43 ll. Laws 1874, at 348.
44 "Whoever attempts to commit any offense prohibited by law, and does any act
towards it but fails, or is intercepted or prevented in its execution, where no express
provision is made by law for the punishment of such attempt, shall be punished. ..
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 581 (1959). (Emphasis added.)
45 Section 581 of ch. 38 is applicable only "where no express provision is made by
law for the punishment of such attempt." See emphasized portion of supra note 44.
Since S 85, at that time punished attempted burglary in the nighttime, no prosecution
for attempted burglary in the nighttime could be laid under the general attempts statute.
Prosecution of such an offense was strictly limited to the specific statute. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, S 85 (1959).
46 5 Il.2d 399, 126 N.E.2d 833 (1955).
47 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 84,85 (1959).
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Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act."48 The new act regulates a wider
range of practices than the former act, and contains a great many
changes which need not be discussed herein. In 1957, the Legislature
repealed the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act,49 and replaced it with a new
uniform act,5" which also expands greatly the area formerly covered.
The definition of a "narcotic drug" is enlarged, apparently in order to
keep pace with modem science.5' The act pertaining to the registration
of drug addicts52 was repealed, and a provision included in the uni-
form act proscribing drug addiction.53 The new act also contains provi-
sions for the forfeiture of vehicles used in narcotics traffic or used to
facilitate narcotics traffic. 4
The principal change wrought by the new act, however, is in the
area of punishment. Generally speaking, possession under the prior
act, if it was a first offense, was a misdemeanor.55 The new act, with
certain exceptions, 56 makes every violation a felony,5 7 provides severe
48 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 186.1-.51 (1959).
49 IU. Laws 1955, at 1424-29.
50 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 192.1-1 to -. 28-44 (1959).
51 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 192.28-2.17 (1959).
52 111. Laws 1953, at 355.
53 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 192.28-3 (1959).
54 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 192.28-25 to -. 28-32 (1959). Section 25 provides for con-
fiscation and forfeiture to the state; § 26 for disposition until forfeiture is declared; § 27
for notice and disposition in the event of default; § 28 for a hearing on the verified
answer of the claimant; § 29 for the protection, in certain cases, of the interests of
mortgagees and lienholders in the event of forfeiture; S 292 for judicial review under
the provisions of the Administrative Review Act; § 30 for sale after forfeiture; § 31 for
disposition of proceeds after sale; and § 32 for methods of payment, security for lien-
holders, and use of the forfeited vehicle by the Division of Narcotic Control to en-
force provisions of the act.
55 Former § 23 (now § 192.23) provided for a fine or imprisonment for a term of
from one to five years, or both, for a first offense of possessing. For a second offense
punishment was in the penitentiary for any term from two years to life. Any selling
offense was punishable by a term of from two years to life. Ill. Laws 1953, at 1531-32.
56 Section 38 provides that whoever violates the act by being under the influence or
addicted to any narcotic drug shall be imprisoned for a period of not less than ninety
days or more than one year. It is also provided that multiple punctures from a hy-
podermic needle shall be prima facie proof of addiction. Probationary release of an
addict is permitted, after service of at least ninety days sentence. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 192.28-38 (1959). This section also contains provisions for punishment of certain
persons who violate certain sections of the act pertaining to the licensed use, possession,
and dispensing of narcotics. These also are misdemeanors.
57 Soliciting, encouraging, endorsing, or initiating any person under the age of
twenty-one with the intent that such person shall violate any provision of the act is
punishable by from two to five years imprisonment in the penitentiary. Selling, pre-
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penalties for subsequent violations,5 and denies even a first offender
charged with selling or dispensing, the right to probation." Further-
scribing, administering, or dispensing in violation of the act is punishable by imprison-
ment in the penitentiary for any term of from ten years to life. Acquiring drugs by
fraud or deceit is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for a period of from
one to three years for each offense, and each violation is a separate offense. Possessing,
controlling, manufacturing, or compounding a narcotic drug in violation of the act is
punishable by a fine and imprisonment for from two to ten years. ILL. REV. STAr. ch. 38,
S 192.28-38 (1959).
58 The second offense of selling, etc., is punishable by a life sentence. The second
offense of possessing, etc., is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for any
term from five years to life. Ibid. Section 38c, in harmony with the Habitual Criminal
Act, see text accompanying supra note 87, Part I, of this article, provides for plead-
ing and proving prior offenses. IL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 192.28-39 (1959).
In People v. Shamery, 415 111. 177, 112 N.E.2d 466 (1953), the defendant, previously
convicted in 1937 of unlawful possession, and sentenced under the provisions in effect at
that time to ninety days in the House of Correction, raised the issue of whether
his subsequent conviction for possession was a subsequent offense under the stat-
ute calling for increased penalties. (The 1951 Act, in effect at the time of the defend-
ant's conviction, provided for the same punishment for a first offender as the 1953 Act.
Ill. Laws 1953, at 1531.) For a subsequent offense the act provided that the violator
should be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term from two years to life. The act
further contained a provision that any "offense under this act shall be deemed a subse-
quent offense if the violator shall have been previously convicted of an offense under
this Act or of a felony under any law of the United States of America, or of any State
or Territory or of the District of Columbia relating to narcotic drugs." The defendant
contended this his prior conviction, under the act in effect in 1937, was only for a
misdemeanor. As noted above, first possession offenses even under the 1951 and 1953
Acts were misdemeanors. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 585 (1959). The court held that
the felony provision in the proviso pertaining to increased penalties related only to con-
victions under the laws of the United States or any other State or Territory or the Dis-
trict of Columbia; any prior Illinois violation would make the increased penalty provi-
sion applicable. This was clear, the court said, because: "The first offense, if committed
in Illinois, could not be a felony and the subsequent offense provision could never
operate if defendant's construction were true." Id. at 181, 112 N.E.2d at 468. See also
People v.Tillman, I Ill.2d 525, 116 N.E.2d 344 (1954).
The present Act removes this problem by providing: "An offense under this Act is
a subsequent offense if the violator has been previously convicted of an offense under
this Act or any previous Act of this State relating to narcotic drugs ... " ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, § 192.28-38 (1959).
It is interesting to note that the receiving-stolen-property statute follows the policy
expressed by the new Uniform Narcotic Drug Act insofar as increased penalties are
involved by providing that any person who receives stolen goods ". . . from any person
known to be a narcotic addict, shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for the first
offense for a period of not less than five years nor more than fifteen years and for any
subsequent offense shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for a period of not less
than ten years nor more than fifteen years." This is in substantial contrast to the pre-
ceding paragraph of the same section, which makes receiving goods worth over
$50 punishable by from one to ten years, and receiving goods worth less than $50 pun-
ishable by a fine and imprisonment in the county jail for a period not exceeding one
year. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 492 (1959).
59 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 192.28-38 (1959). Probation is denied any violator con-
victed of any subsequent offense.
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more, section 38 of the act proscribes the dispensing, selling, etc. of
any non-narcotic substance under the guise that it is a narcotic. The
act also contains provisions for the supervision and control of nar-
cotics addicts.60
Also enacted in 1957 was a provision forbidding electronic eaves-
dropping.6 The act prohibits ". . . the use of any device employing
electricity to hear or record, or both, all or any part of any oral con-
versation ... without consent of any party thereto, whether such con-
versation is conducted in person or by telephone. '6 2 Evidence gained
by a violation of the act is not admissible in any criminal trial, or legis-
lative or administrative proceeding, or grand jury proceeding.63 The
act also prohibits the divulging of any information known to be ob-
tained in violation of the act.64 It will be interesting to observe the
degree of enforcement of this act.65
The Illinois Shop-Lifting Act,66 enacted in 1957, was designed to
give merchants added protection from shop-lifters and to provide a
defense to any civil action arising out of the reasonable detention, by
the merchant or his agent, of a suspected shop-lifter.6 7
The law of bribery has been materially changed. Heretofore the rule
has been, as set out in People v. Peters,6 that the offense of bribery is not
complete unless both parties to the transaction act from a corrupt
motive. In People v. Lyons,6 9 the court overruled the Peters case and
held that a reasonable construction of the statutes requires that any per-
son who corruptly engages in such a transaction is guilty of bribery
regardless of the motive of the other party.
An interesting change has taken place in the area of the law regard-
ing thefts. In 1951, the Legislature raised the dividing line between
larceny and petit larceny to fifty dollars.70 It was not until 1953 that
the amount was increased to an equal figure in cases of receiving stolen
goods.71 Then, in 1959, the boundary, insofar as larceny was con-
cerned, was raised to three hundred dollars.72 Thus far the receiving
60 Ibid. See supra note 56, Part II, of this article. See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
SS 192.33-37 (1959), regulating the sale and possession of hypodermic syringes and
needles.
61 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 206.1-.5 (1959). 67 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 252.2 (1959).
62 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206.1 (1959). 68 265 M1. 122, 106 N.E. 513 (1914).
63 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206.3 (1959). 69 4 l.2d 396, 122 N.E.2d 809 (1954).
64 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 206.4 (1959). 70 111. Laws 1951, at 180.
65 See DASH, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1960). 71111. Laws 1953, at 353.
06 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §S 252.1-.4 (1959). 72 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 389 (1959).
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statute has not caught up with the inflationary principles which moti-
vated the amendment of the larceny statute.7" Therefore, by reason of
the differences in the respective amounts required by the larceny and
stolen goods statutes for a felony, a first offender7 4 who steals property
worth $299.99 is a misdemeanant; but one to whom he sells the prop-
erty, and who receives it knowing that it was stolen, although also a
first offender,75 is a felon.An act passed in 1951 providing a penalty for preventing a person
in custody from consulting with an attorney or notifying his family of
the fact that he is so held 76 appears to be as doomed to oblivion as the
eavesdropping statute. There is some evidence that the practice of the
local law enforcement agencies is still to spirit away suspects in "hot"
cases from one district to another in order to avoid their communicat-
ing with their attorneys." It appears that the Legislature has deemed
73 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 492 (1959).
74 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 5 393 (1959), provides increased penalties for repeated petit
larcenies by persons over the age of eighteen years, and for third offenses by any
person.
75 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, S 493 (1959), also provides increased penalties for subsequent
offenses of receiving stolen property.
7 6 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 449.1 (1959); cf. hIL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 477 (1959).
77 The following example, adapted from an actual case, is illustrative:Q. . . . Did you have occasion to go to the Blank Street Police Station while acting in
that capacity? [as the accused's attorney]
A. I did.
Q. And at approximately what time did you arrive at the Blank Street Police Station?
A. About 7:30 in the evening.
I greeted them [members of the accused's family], immediately went to the sergeant's
desk, presented my card, my professional card, stated that I was X's attorney and I
wished to see him.
Q. Will you tell us who you spoke to?
A. I spoke to a man in the uniform of the Police Department behind the sergeant's
desk.
A. i said [to him] that I'm X's attorney and I wished to see him immediately.
Q. What did he say?
A. He said-the man at the desk, that I directed my remark to and handed the card
to, handed it back to me and said, "You'll have to see the Captain, counsel." I said,
"Where is his office, please?" He said, "Right across the room."
Q., Did you have a conversation with Captain Y?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Was anyone else present when you had this conversation?
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this same action to be a crime, and some effort ought to be made to
comply with the dictates of the Legislature.
Substantial changes were wrought by the 1953 Legislature in the
statute defining perjury. Strictly speaking the changes were made in
the nature of the allegations that are necessary in an indictment for
A. There was another man in Captain Y's office.
Q. Do you know the name of the other man in the office, Mr. Z?
A. I do not.
Q. All right. And what did you say to Captain Y and what did he say to you, if
anything?
A. I asked him if he were Captain Y, the commanding officer of the district. He
said that he was. I handed him my professional card and said, "I am X's lawyer and I
wish to see him immediately, Captain." He said, "You'll have to wait a minute, Mr. Z."
A." I stepped out of the Captain's office into the ante-room and sat at the edge of a
desk about six feet from the Captain.
A. [After leaving the ante-room for a few minutes] the next thing that occurred
was that I again went into Captain Y.
Q. Then you had another conversation with him at that time?
A. I did.
Q. Who was present at that conversation?
A. That same gentleman whose name I don't know.
Q. What did you say to Captain Y and what did Captain Y say to you, if anything?
A. I said, "Captain Y, if I'm to be of any professional use to X, I must see him at
once." Captain Y said to me, "Mr. Z, I have a lawyer, too,-that's A of the State's
Attorney's office-and I have put in a call for him. I can't let you see X without the
okay of Mr. A."
Q. Then you say you went out to the X family. Did you then return back to the
ante-room or to the office of Captain Y?
A. I did. I returned to the ante-room within about a minute.
Q. All right. When you got to the ante-room, what did you observe, insofar as
Captain Y and the other gentleman with him were concerned?
A. Captain Y was still sitting on his desk and this other gentleman was still on the
telephone.
Q. Did you have another conversation with Captain Y at that time?
A. I sat on the edge of the desk and called into the Captain, "Have you been able
to reach A'?"
He said, "Not yet counsel," and closed the door between his office and the ante-room.
Q. Did you then remain in the ante-room, Mr. Z, from that time on?
A. I remained there for several more minutes and smoked a cigarette.
A. I had stepped out of the ante-room, conversed with the X family and was
standing in the sergeant's room when Captain Y emerged from his office in the ante-
room and walked across the sergeant's room.
Q. And did you note where he went, when he walked across the sergeant's room?
A. He walked to the rear of the sergeant's room and through the door into some
other area of the station.
Q. Did you have any conversation with Captain Y at that time, as he passed through?
A. I said, "'What about it, Captain? Can I see him?"
Q. And then, when he disappeared beyond the door into the ante-room or, rather,
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perjury,r8 and the evidence sufficient for a conviction. 9 Prior to 1953,
it was necessary, in an indictment for perjury arising out of two con-
tradictory statements, to allege in the indictment which statement was
false.80 At times this imposed a burden upon the prosecution. The rule
was changed to provide
* . .that in every indictment for perjury where the falsity is based upon the
giving of contradictory statements under oath ... , it shall be sufficient to
allege the making of such contradictory statements or the giving of such con-
tradictory testimony, without alleging which statement or testimony is true,
or which is false, but it shall be sufficient to allege in the alternative that one
or the other was false, and given or made corruptly and wilfully.8 '
Prosecution under such an indictment is made effective by the further
provision that ". . . falsity shall be presumptively established by proof
the squad room, how long before he emerged again?
A. He returned again after several minutes. I cannot say precisely.
Q. Did you have a conversation with him at that time?
A. Again I asked him if I could see the boy.Q. And what response did Captain Y make?
A. He did not respond to me but continued walking through the ante-room into
his office and closed the door.
Q. Did you have any other conversations on this evening with Captain Y after this
last one you have just testified to?
A. Over a period of about an hour to an hour and fifteen minutes-I would say an
hour and fifteen minutes-the Captain emerged from his office, walked through the
sergeant's room, disappeared into the rear room and re-emerged and walked through
the sergeant's room and back through the ante-room and into his office at least a
dozen times. On every one of those occasions, excepting, at the most two, I asked him
if I could see X now.
Q. And what was his response to your request?
A. "In just a little while."
Q. When did you have your last conversation with Captain Y . . .at the Police
Station?
A. At about a quarter to nine.Q. And who was present at that conversation?
A. The Captain and I were alone.
Q. And where did this conversation take place?
A. It took place in the asembly room behind the sergeant's room, the Captain having
come into the sergeant's room and motioned me to follow him, which I did. And inside
the assembly room he informed me, he said to me, "Mr. Z, the X boy has been taken
down to the State's Attorney's office. The State's Attorney told me that I was not to
permit you to see him and he is gone from the station."
78 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 475 (1959).
79 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 475a (1959).
80 See People v. Berry, 309 IM. 511, 141 N.E. 132 (1923): "... [Aln indictment for
perjury or subornation of perjury is sufficient, if it sets forth the substance of the offense
charged . . . and that the testimony charged to have been given was false." Id. at 513,
141 N.E. at 133. (Emphasis added.)
81 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 475 (1959).
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that the defendant has given such testimony or made such statements
under oath on occasions in which an oath is required by law, without
proving which statement or testimony is true, or which is false. '8 2
This section does provide, however, that if the contradictory testi-
mony is in the same trial, a subsequent admission by the witness, in
that trial, that his prior contradictory testimony was untrue, coupled
with a recitation of the truth during that trial shall be a complete de-
fense to prosecution for perjury insofar as the truthful testimony has
corrected the prior contradictory testimony.
A most significant statutory enactment of the 1950's is that provid-
ing for the granting of immunity from prosecution or punishment of
material witnesses called to testify before a grand jury or in a criminal
prosecution. 3 Here again the authors may be encroaching upon the
realm of procedural law, for the act is designed as an aid to prosecution
and investigation. But the act also contains provisions for the protection
of substantive rights, and, for the recalcitrant witness who has been pro-
vided these rights and protections, a provision for punishment.8 4
Immunity acts in general have already been too thoroughly com-
mented upon for the authors to try to do so here;"' so also have the
federal law and cases interpreting the federal law."" But the Illinois act,
as it attempts to complement the federal act,"7 has generated important
problems, and these should most certainly be considered.
The immunity statute enacted in 1953 was not essentially a novel
provision in Illinois law. Generally it follows the procedure set forth
by other, existing acts.88 Wherever testimony of a material witness,
82 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 475a (1959).
8: ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 580a (1959).
84 The act provides that any witness who has been granted immunity and refuses to
testify or otherwise give evidence "may be punished for contempt of the court and
sentenced to the county jail for not more than two years." Ibid. Note that normally
contempt of court is punished under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 600 (1959). which pro-
vides for a fine and a maximum jail sentence of one year. See Beattie v. People, 33 111.
App. 651 (1889).
85 Rogge, Compelling the Testimony of Political Deviants, 55 MICH. L. REV. 163
(1956); Comment, 26 U. CHI. L. REv. 164 (1958).
86 Thompson, Self-Incrimination and the Two Sovereignties Rule, 49 J. CRIM. L., C.
& P.S. 240 (1958); Comment, 46 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 673 (1956).
87 18 U.S.C.A. § 3486 (Supp. 1960).
88 The act granting immunity to certain witnesses in bribery prosecutions, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, S 82 (1959), dates back to 1874, and the immunity section, ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, § 245 (1959), of the act pertaining to the obtaining of money to settle employ-
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called by the prosecution either before a grand jury or in a criminal
prosecution, would tend to incriminate that witness, the court may, on
motion of the State's Attorney, order ".... that such witness be released
from all liability to be prosecuted or punished on account of any trans-
action, matter or thing concerning which he may be required to testi-
fy or produce evidence, documentary or otherwise. ... 8I9 The order
called for by the act operates as a bar to any prosecution of the witness
for any crime shown by such testimony or evidence, except perjury aris-
ing therefrom. The act further provides that if it reasonably appears to
the court that the testimony or evidence sought would subject the
witness to prosecution under the laws of another state or the United
States, the court shall refuse to grant the order.
The latter provision is novel to Illinois law, and is significant in that
it grants protection which the Legislature need not constitutionally
provide."' Indeed, were the statute to grant immunity from federal
prosecution in return for a witness's testimony, it would no doubt be
ineffectual. 1 The interpretation of this provision, however, has caused
some disagreement as to its meaning. In People v. Burkert,92 the State's
Attorney of Lake County procured an order granting a recalcitrant
witness immunity in return for his testimony before a grand jury in-
vestigating vice and gambling. The court, in its order, provided that
the respondent should not be required to give any testimony relating
to certain matters, upon the respondent's testimony that he might be
subject to federal prosecution for certain acts or omissions based upon
disclosure of those matters. The respondent was taken before the
grand jury and interrogated, and the interrogation was limited in con-
formity with the court's order. The respondent refused to answer the
ment disputes, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 242-46 (1959), extends back to 1921. Outside of
the CRIMINAL CODE, the immunity section, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, § 453.10a (1959), of
the Illinois Cigarette Tax Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 120, §§ 453.1-.30 (1959), has been in
effect since 1945.
89 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 580a (1959).
OOTwining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); People v. Burkert, 7 11.2d 506, 131
N.E.2d 495 (1955); Annot., 38 A.L.R.2d 257, 267 (1954). The federal government can
provide immunity from state prosecution. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896);
Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). It must, of course, recognize the privilege
against self-incrimination and provide immunity from federal prosecution if it wishes
to compel testimony from a witness. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See Thompson, supra
note 86, at 249.
91 U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2 (supremacy clause).
92 7 I1l.2d 506, 131 N.E.2d 495 (1955).
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questions and, upon petition by the State's Attorney, was held in con-
tempt. On review, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the effect of
the qualifying provision of the Illinois statute was to give a witness the
protection of the fifth amendment as well as the protection of the
applicable section of the Illinois Constitution. 93 In considering the fed-
eral cases on the subject of the type of inquiry which may be self-
incriminating and the circumstances under which a witness may refuse
to answer these questions, the court adopted the principle that
... to sustain the privilege it need only be evident from the implication of the
question in the setting in which it is asked that a responsive answer to the
question, or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous
because injurious disclosure could result, and that consequently the privilege
included answers that might furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute the witness for a Federal crime.
9 4
Hence, the court concluded, the witness could refuse to answer ques-
tions unless it was "perfectly clear" that his answers could not pos-
sibly have a tendency to incriminate him under the Federal law, and
the order granting immunity was not in conformity with the statute
and was void."5
B. CASE LAW CHANGES
No more fruitful source of the new case law is to be found than in
those cases involving alleged unlawful searches and seizures. And, be-
cause each case involving a search and seizure invariably raises the con-
tention that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to
suppress certain evidence taken from the defendant in violation of,
and contrary to, sections 6 and 10 of the Constitution of the State of
Illinois," a great body of constitutional law has been generated by
93 ILL. CONST. art. II, S 10.
94 People v. Burkert, 7 Ill.2d 506, 515-16, 131 N.E.2d 495, 499-500 (1955).
95 "We believe therefore, that he was properly entitled to the protection against self
incrimination afforded by the terms of the Illinois Witness Immunity Act, and the
immunity order issued was not in accordance with the statute and was therefore void.
Hence defendant's refusal to answer any of the questions where there was no im-
munity whatever granted could not be deemed a contempt of court." Id. at 518, 131
N.E.2d at 501.
96 Every practicing lawyer seems to delight in alleging violations of every one of
the defendant's constitutional rights. As a result, the usual motion to suppress includes
not only allegations that the search and seizure were contrary to §§ 6 and 10 of article
II of the Illinois Constitution, but also allegations that the acts complained of violated
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. One can never
tell when he may have a Rochin case on his hands. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165
(1952). Theoretically, however, the only proper allegation, insofar as the Illinois
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each new search and seizure case. The theory encompassed by the "ex-
clusionary rule" in Illinois is not new; it extends back into the early
1920's,97 and only recently has again been reaffirmed by the court.0s
Perhaps the most interesting phenomenon of the past decade, inso-
far as the law of search and seizure is concerned, is the fact that there
has been only one reported decision of any importance involving the
validity or use of a search warrant.9° In People v. Dolgin, °0° a warrant
issued authorizing a state highway policeman to search for bogus
cigarette tax stamps and the tools for making them. The warrant was
based on a complaint which stated, in part, that the basis for believing
that the stamps were contained in the place sought to be searched was
that the affiant had purchased cigarettes with bogus stamps affixed at
Constitution is concerned, is that the search and seizure violated § 6 of article II of
that constitution. People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960); City of Chi-
cago v. Lord, 3 111. App.2d 410, 122 N.E.2d 439 (1954), aff'd,'7 Il1.2d 379, 130 N.E.2d
504 (1955). This conclusion served, in the Mayo case, as the basis of the court's rejec-
tion of an argument that a motion to suppress contraband cannot lie, even where the
property is admittedly illegally seized, because (1) an accused must have an interest
in property before he can petition for its suppression, People v. Kalpak, 10 Ill.2d 411,
140 N.E.2d 726 (1957); People v. Perry, 1 Ill.2d 482, 116 N.E.2d 360 (1954); (2) the
admission in evidence of property cannot incriminate a person unless he owns the
property; and (3) since no one can be the owner of contraband, no one can be in-
criminated by its admission into evidence, whether or not it was unlawfully seized.
People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
Nor can an accused be forced to incriminate himself by his motion to suppress where
the prosecution relies on possession of contraband, see, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 192.28-3 (1959), as a basis for conviction. In such a case it is not necessary for the
defendant to allege possession. People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960);
but see People v. Savanna Lodge No. 1095, 344 IMI. App. 278, 100 N.E.2d 632 (1951).
Thus, an effective way of avoiding incriminating statements regarding possession in
a motion to suppress is illustrated in the following example:
"Your petitioner further represents that he has been informed and he believes that
certain police officers of the City of Chicago will testify in the trial of the above
entitled cause that on [date] they arrested your petitioner and took from his person
certain purported narcotics.
"Your petitioner further represents that he is informed and he believes that the here-
inbefore described narcotics are now in the possession of the Police Department of
the City of Chicago, and that the People of the State of Illinois intend to introduce
them in evidence in the trial of the above entitled cause."
Of course, allegations of why such evidence would be inadmissible must also be in-
cluded in the motion.
97 People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923); People v. Castree, 311 111.
392, 143 N.E. 112 (1924).
98 People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
99 The procedure for obtaining a search warrant and the matters for which a war-
rant may issue are set forth in ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, §5 691, 692 (1959). And, see ILL.
CONST. art. II, S 6.
100 415 111.434, 114 N.E.2d 398 (1953).
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various establishments, five of which exclusively purchased their ciga-
rettes from the place sought to be searched, for a period of six weeks-
the last time forty-nine days prior to the date the complaint for the
warrant was sworn out. The court rejected the contentions of the de-
fendant that a state highway police officer was not authorized by the
statute to execute the warrant and that the period of delay between the
date of the last purchase of cigarettes and the date on which the com-
plaint was sworn out vitiated the warrant. As to the last contention,
the court held that since the complaint stated that the wholesaler had
made deliveries of cigarettes bearing bogus stamps over a period of six
weeks, the magistrate could reasonably believe that this was a continu-
ing offense and thus it was not unreasonable to conclude that the con-
traband was, at the time of the complaint, still on the premises.
There have been during the last decade, however, as many impor-
tant decisions involving searches without warrants as there have been
few decisions concerning the validity of warrants. And for a time it
seemed as though the only limits that could or would be placed on the
right to search without a warrant were the natural limits of an officer's
ingenuity. It all began with a parking violation.' 0' Late one evening
three police officers assigned to the gambling detail observed the de-
fendant park his automobile on the street.10 2 The officers stopped the
defendant and one of them measured the distance of the automobile's
wheels from the curb. 10 3 The front wheels were found to exceed the
permissible distance by nine inches and the rear ones by six inches.10 4
The officers then saw some papers protruding about two inches from
the defendant's rear pockets and asked him what they were. 10 When
the defendant replied, "policy slips," an officer withdrew them, taking
care not to place his hand inside the defendant's pocket.106 The officers
then searched the defendant's car and discovered other policy parapher-
nalia therein. The defendant was then formally charged with the posses-
sion of policy slips. The assignment of error that the defendant had been
subjected to an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the con-
stitution was based upon the assumption that he had not been arrested
until after the policy slips had been discovered in his possession. The
court, in People v. Clark, °7 held, however, that a valid arrest had pre-
101 People v. Clark, 9 1ll.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956).
102 Id. at 403, 137 N.E.2d at 822. 105 Ibid.
103 Ibid. 100 Ibid.
104 Ibid. 107 9 Il1.2d 400, 137 N.E.2d 820 (1956).
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ceded the search of the defendant. Starting with the statutory author-
ity for an arrest without a warrant,' and continuing with the proposi-
tion that the authority to arrest without a warrant for a criminal
offense included misdemeanors, i.e., traffic offenses, as well as felo-
nies,' 019 the court concluded that if the defendant had violated a
municipal parking ordinance in the presence of the officers they had a
right to arrest him without a warrant. And then the "bomb" fell:
"Where the arrest is justified, for whatever cause, the accompanying
search is also justified." 110
The technique affirmed by the Clark case was employed in varying
ways"' for approximately three and one-half years. Then it ceased
the same way it had begun, with an arrest for a parking violation and
the subsequent discovery of policy slips. In People v. Watkins112 the
court re-examined its decision in the Clark case. Watkins, like his
predecessor, was negligent in parking his car; he parked it too close to
a crosswalk. The arresting officers, observing this, waited for Watkins,
whom they knew from prior arrests which they had made, to reappear
from the building which he had entered. When Watkins did reappear,
he saw the officers and then ran back into the building. Thereafter, the
officers arrested the defendant and, upon searching him, discovered the
policy slips. The court, in announcing its decision to re-examine the
Clark decision, reaffirmed the several principles which resulted in that
decision. "But," the court said, "when they are combined, trans-
planted, and used to govern the interpretation of the constitution, they
produce an improper result.""1 Hereafter, the court would examine
the nature of the offense for which the defendant was arrested and the
108 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 657 (1959). An arrest without a warrant may be made
by an officer for a criminal offense committed or attempted in his presence.
109 In People v. Edge, 406 111. 490, 94 N.E.2d 359 (1950), the court held that an arrest
for two municipal ordinance violations (obstructing an alley and not having a motor
vehicle safety-inspection certificate) would sustain a subsequent search, even though
the defendant was acquitted of the ordinance violation charge.
110 People v. Clark, 9 Ill.2d 400, 404, 137 N.E.2d 820, 822 (1956). See also People v.
Tabet, 402 I11. 93, 83 N.E.2d 329 (1948).
111 People v, Berry, 17 Ill.2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (1959) (Defendant's car did not
have license plates or city sticker); People v. Esposito, 18 I1l.2d 104, 163 N.E.2d 487
(1959) (Two men driving down street in automobile with unlighted rear license;
when police stopped them, passenger ran away).
112 19 Ill.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960).
'13 Id. at 18, 166 N.E.2d at 436.
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surrounding circumstances to determine whether the search was war-
ranted." 4 Applying this standard the court concluded that a
... minor traffic offense that ordinarily results in a "parking ticket" hung on
the handle of the door of the car, telling the offender that it is not necessary
to appear in court if he mails in the amount of his fine .... does not, in itself,
raise the kind of inferences which justify searches in other cases. 115
To that extent the Clark case and People v. Berry"1 6 were overruled.
But the court did not hold that no traffic offense would justify a
search, 117 and to that extent Watkins was denied the relief for which
he has already become famous. The fact that he was known to the
officers, and his suspicious actions upon discovering that they were
following him, led the court to conclude that in this case his arrest and
subsequent search were based on reasonable grounds. 18 James Mayo,
however, benefited from Watkins' misfortune. He was observed park-
ing too far away from the curb and arrested as he emerged from his
car. Although policy slips were found in the glove compartment, the
arresting officer admitted that at the time of the search he was merely
on a "fishing expedition. '"119 Although the state conceded the invalid-
ity of the search in the Mayo case the standard announced in the Wat-
kins case undoubtedly would have been effective without this conces-
sion. 120 In examining "the nature of the offense [for which the de-
fendant was arrested] and the surrounding circumstances to determine
114 The court indicated that in examining the surrounding circumstances to deter-
mine if the search was warranted, it will apply the following standard: "A search
incident to an arrest is authorized when it is reasonably necessary to protect the
arresting officer from attack, to prevent the prisoner from escaping, or to discover
fruits of a crime." Id. at 18, 166 N.E.2d at 437. Thus in. People v. Burnett, 20 Ill.2d 624,
170 N.E.2d 546 (1960), the court held, citing Watkins and the standard set forth above,
that the search of a locked tin box belonging to the defendant after his arrest for
participating in a lewd show was unreasonable because "there is nothing in the record
to indicate that a search of the tin box ... was reasonably necessary to protect the
officers or to prevent the defendant's escape. In addition, all the evidence had been
gathered which would tend to prove or to connect defendant and the two women
with the offense for which they had been arrested." Id. at 625-26, 170 N.E.2d at 547.
115 Id. at 19, 166 N.E.2d at 437.
116 17 Ill.2d 247, 161 N.E.2d 315 (1959).
117 Both the Berry and Esposito cases were, on their facts, upheld. People v. Watkins,
19 Ill.2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960).
118 "With this in mind, we think that the circumstances made it reasonable for the
arresting officers to assume that they were dealing with a situation more serious than
a routine parking violation." People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.2d 11, 19, 166 N.E.2d 433, 437
(1960).
119 People v. Mayo, 19 Ill.2d 136, 166 N.E.2d 440 (1960).
120 See supra note 114.
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whether the search was warranted,' 12' the court could not have but
arrived at the following conclusions:
1) It did not appear from the record that a search was reasonably necessary
to protect the arresting officer from attack;
2) Nor did it appear that the defendant was bent upon escaping;
3) The nature of the offense excluded the possibility that any "fruits of the
crime" might have been involved.' 22
Hence, if the Watkins case were to be followed, the conclusion was
inescapable that although the arrest in the Mayo case was valid, the
search was not.
Of equal importance during the 1950's was the question of when an
arresting officer had reasonable grounds for making an arrest without
a warrant. 128 In the last ten years the concept of "reasonable grounds"
as a determinative of the validity of an arrest, has been considerably
watered down by the court. At one point a member of the court was
prompted to remark that a decision holding that reasonable grounds
existed for making an arrest where the officers had been given a "lead"
by an unidentified informer and upon checking this "lead" found his
information to be substantially correct, 1 4 "makes a mockery of sec-
121 People v.Watkins, 19 111.2d 11, 18, 166 N.E.2d 433,437 (1960).
12' Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Section on Criminal Law, Noose Letter, Nov. 1960,
suggests this interpretation of the Mayo case. People v. Burnett, 20 Ill.2d 624, 170 N.E.2d
546 (1960), seems to validate the interpretation.
123 An arrest by a police officer without a warrant, for a crime not committed
in his presence, is lawful "when a criminal offense has in fact been committed and
[the arresting officer] has reasonable grounds for believing that the person to be
arrested committed it." People v. Boozer, 12 Ill.2d 184, 187, 145 NZE.2d 619, 621 (1957);
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 5 657 (1959). Whether "reasonable grounds" existed is deter-
mined by whether a reasonable man in possession of the knowledge which has come
to the arresting officer, would believe that the person arrested is guilty of a criminal
offense. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); People v. Galloway, 7 ll1.2d 527,
131 N.E.2d 474 (1956); People v. McGurn, 341 MU. 632, 173 N.E. 754 (1930). It is not
merely a suspicion, Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959), but, on the other hand,
it means something less than evidence which would result in a conviction, People v.
Fiorito, 19 Ill.2d 246, 166 N.E.2d 606 (1960); People v. Jones, 16 ll.2d 569, 158 N.E.2d
773 (1959).
124 People v. Tillman, 7 ll.2d 525, 116 N.E.2d 344 (1953). The police received a call
from an unidentified person telling them that a man called "Trench Coat"-and giv-
ing them a description of him-was living in a certain room in a certain hotel with
a certain described woman. The informer also told the police that this man sold
narcotics and that he had sold some to an addict the previous day. Shortly thereafter,
the police went to the hotel, where they found the woman standing outside the door
to the room where Trench Coat was alleged to be staying. The door was partly open
and the police observed Trench Coat lying on a bed inside the room. The police
arrested the woman, brought her into the room, searched the robe she was wearing,
and found therein five capsules of narcotics. The defendant was then awakened and
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don 6 of Art. II of the Illinois constitution.' 12 Nevertheless, the trend
continued, to the extent, even, of permitting reasonable grounds to be
shown by hearsay testimony.' 26 And, where reasonable grounds could
not be shown for making an arrest, the device of "consent" was re-
sorted to.
The idea that a defendant may waive his constitutional right to in-
violability of home and person is not novel.127 The only limit to this
waiver, is the qualification that it must be freely and intelligently
given. 28 The latest pronouncement by the court in this area, however,
arrested. He admitted that some people called him "Trench Coat" during a con-
versation with the police. A search of his mattress and bed disclosed ninety-five cap-
sules of heroin.
The contention that the search of the room without a warrant was unreasonable
was disposed of on the basis of United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); People
v. McGowan, 415 III. 375, 114 N.E.2d 407 (1953); People v. Tabet, 402 111. 93, 83
N.E.2d 329 (1949); and other cited cases. The question of whether the arrest was rea-
sonable was treated in a manner which last found expression in the Watkins case:
"There is no formula for a determination of what is reasonable. The constantly re-
curring problem in this field must separately find resolution in the facts and circum-
stances of each case." People v. Tillman, 1 Ill.2d 525, 530, 116 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1954).
After concluding that the officers had reasonable cause to arrest the defendant because
of the extrinsic circumstances which corroborated the information given by the in-
formant, the court stated: "Certainly, the defendant and his confederate were com-
mitting a crime in the presence of the officers, because without contradiction they
were in possession of, and had under their control, narcotic drugs in violation of.
[the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act]." Id. at 531, 116 N.E.2d at 348.
If the concealed possession of contraband in the presence of police officers is the
commission of a crime in the presence of an officer such as would justify an arrest
without a warrant, see ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 657 (1959), every arrest without a
warrant and subsequent search which disclosed contraband, would be legal. But see
People v.McGurn, 341 Ill. 630,173 N.E. 754 (1931). See supra note 114.
125 People v. Tillman, 1 Ill.2d 525, 533, 116 N.E.2d 344, 349 (1953) (dissenting opin-
ion).
126 People v. LaBostrie, 14 Ill.2d 617, 153 N.E.2d 570 (1958); People v. Jones, 16
l1.2d 569, 158 N.E.2d 773 (1959). To the same effect in the federal courts, see Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
Illinois still insists that the affidavit in support of a complaint for a search warrant
be based on first hand knowledge, People v. Elias, 316 Ill. 376, 147 N.E. 472 (1925), but
the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld a search warrant which was issued
on the basis of hearsay evidence, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
127 People v. Reid, 336 Ill. 421, 168 N.E. 344 (1929); People v. Akers, 327 III. 137,
158 N.E. 410 (1927); People v. McDonald, 365 Ill. 233, 6 N.E.2d 182 (1936).
128 See People v. Lind, 370 111. 131, 18 N.E.2d 189 (1938). And, of course, the
consent must be given by someone authorized to give it. Thus, where a wife who
owns an interest in the property authorizes a search of that property, a motion by
the husband, also an owner of an interest, to suppress evidence discovered therein
will not lie. People v. Shambley, 4 Ill.2d 38, 122 N.E.2d 172 (1954); People v. Perroni,
14 Ill.2d 581, 153 N.E.2d 578 (1958). Consent may not, however, be given by someone
who has no interest in the property. People v. Dent, 371 Ill. 33, 19 N.E.2d 1020 (1939).
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indicates the burden with which the defendant is faced when the
arresting officers testify that he "consented" to their searching his per-
son or his effects; if the trier of fact concludes that consent was given,
the court will not upset this ruling unless it is patently erroneous. 12
The theory may be sound; a determination of controversial facts and
the credibility of witnesses is just as much involved as in any other facet
of trial practice.3 0 But in practice, the theory breaks down, for often
compliance by the accused with orders or directions of the police is
misconstrued as "consent." Our courts would do well to study and con-
sider some of the federal cases on the subject of consent.13
Following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ro-
viaro v. United States, 32 in which that Court held that the govern-
ment, in a narcotics prosecution, was not warranted under the facts in
the case from withholding the identity of an informer, the Illinois
Court was faced with a similar problem. In People v. Mack,13 the
court upheld the privilege of the state to withhold disclosure of the
identity of an informer who had signed the complaint for a search
warrant. The court concluded in the Mack case, that since the facts
sworn to by the informer took place on a different date than the
charge in the indictment, the informer's testimony was only necessary
to test the sufficiency of the search wararnt. Because the warrant was
clearly sufficient, the court did not feel that the defendant had in any
way been prejudiced by the inaccessibility of the informer.8 4
129People v. Peterson, 17 Il.2d 513, 162 N.E.2d 380 (1959). See also People v.
Mathews, 406 Ill. 35, 92 N.E.2d 147 (1950).
130 People v. Arnold, 2 Ill.2d 92, 116 N.E.2d 882 (1954); People v. Viti, 408 111. 206,
96 N.E.2d 541 (1951); People v. Weber, 401 Il. 584, 83 N.E.2d 297 (1949) (Question
of the voluntary nature of a confession is for the trial court, and the Supreme Court
will not disturb the finding unless "manifestly against the weight of the evidence." Id.
at 598, 83 N.E.2d at 305).
131 See, e.g., Judd v. United States, 190 F.2d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1951) (Burden on
the government to prove by "clear and convincing" evidence that the defendant had
consented to search, and had not merely complied with orders of officers).
132 353 U.S. 53 (1957).
133 12 ll.2d 151,145 N.E.2d 609 (1957).
134 ,,. . lt is our opinion that, regardless of what the informer's testimony might
have been, it would have little relevancy in face of the independent evidence by which
the crime of March 22 was proved. Under such a circumstance, together with the
facts which show that the informer neither participated in the crime nor was present
at the time of the raid or arrest, amplification or contradiction of the information
which caused the defendant to be placed under surveillance and caught in the com-
mission of his crime would be of no assistance to his defense." Id. at 166, 145 N.E.2d at
616.
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Aside from the constitutional questions which have been presented
to the court relative to searches and seizures, one case, People v.
Moore,"'3 has raised the interesting question of the jurisdiction of the
court to hear an appeal by the state from an order suppressing evi-
dence and ordering its return. In Moore, the trial court entertained, at
the same hearing, both a motion to suppress and a motion for return of
the property seized. The court granted both facets of the motion and
the state appealed from that portion of the order directing the state to
return the evidence seized-$18,000-to the persons from whom it had
been seized. The court held, inter alia, that the right to the return of
property seized was distinct from the right to have property illegally
seized suppressed in a criminal proceeding. An action claiming a right
of possession of property seized under the claim that it is contraband is
a proceeding in rem; in such a proceeding the state has the right to
have the court determine whether such property is contraband, and, if
an adverse decision is rendered by the trial court, the state has the right
to appeal that decision, for it is not, as such, a decision in a criminal
proceeding.
The court's attention during the past decade has often been directed
to the problem of a defendant's right to counsel and associated prob-
lems. Most often the issue has been raised by the claim that counsel was
incompetent. Generally speaking, the court has followed one general
rule: If counsel was incompetent, and was appointed, the court will
upset the conviction. 13 6 On the other hand, even though counsel may
have been incompetent, if he was counsel of the defendant's choice,
the court will affirm the conviction.137 As is the case with every good
general rule, however, there are exceptions. The decision in one of
these, People v. Cox,13 is significant more for what the court rejected
as the basis for its decision than for what it finally accepted as its ra-
tionale of decision. The defendant, a fourteen-year-old boy charged
with murder, was represented by a charlatan retained by the boy's
135 410 1. 241, 102 N.E.2d 146 (1951).
136 People v. Morris, 3 IU.2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954); People v. Blevins, 251 111.
381, 96 N.E. 214 (1911); People v. Gardiner, 303 111. 204, 135 N.E. 422 (1922); People
v. Winchester, 352 Ill. 237, 185 N.E. 580 (1933); People v. Schulman, 299 Ill. 125, 132
N.E. 530 (1921).
'37 People v. Barnes, 270 Ill. 574, 110 N.E. 881 (1915). See cases cited in People v.
Morris, 3 Ill.2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810, 815 (1954), and in People v. Cox, 12 l1.2d 265,
146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).
138 12 l1.2d 265, 146 N.E.2d 19 (1957).
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mother. Although he was not a member of any bar, the charlatan was
not without ability, 39 however, for the jury, upon finding the boy
guilty as charged, sentenced him to serve a term of only fourteen years.
Subsequent to the charlatan's discovery, the defendant petitioned the
trial court, under the Illinois Post-Conviction Act,140 for his release.
Upon denial of this petition, he sought a writ of error from the Su-
preme Court. The court reversed, holding that the totality of facts in
the case demonstrated that the defendant had been denied a fair trial.
Cox's assertion was not that his attorney's fraud had prejudiced his
case nor that he had suffered a disadvantage because of that fraud.
Rather, he contended that he was denied a fair trial and his constitu-
tional right to be represented by counsel solely because his counsel
was not licensed to practice law. The State traversed this on the basis
of the admitted satisfactory conduct of Cox's trial and defense. Con-
cededly, the due process clauses of both the state and federal constitu-
tions were involved and, to the extent that they were involved, the
meaning of the sixth amendment was important to the defendant's con-
tentions. The court also conceded that the term "counsel" as it is em-
ployed in these constitutional provisions means a duly qualified and
licensed attorney. The right to be represented by a licensed attorney
does not, however, mean that an accused cannot waive that right, the
same as he can waive the right to be represented by counsel at all.1 1
Furthermore,
.. while want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lack-
ing in . . .fundamental fairness, the fourteenth amendment does not embody
an inexorable command that no trial can ever be fairly conducted and justice
accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel. Thus, in the present
case, the test of due process is not whether the defendant had an attorney,
licensed or unlicensed, but whether, under all the circumstances of the case,
his conviction was obtained in such a manner as to be offensive to the common
and fundamental ideas of what is fair and what is right.142
Essentially, then, the problem was not the fact that Cox's attorney was
unlicensed,'143 nor that he was retained by Cox's mother rather than
139 This was the basis of the State's contention in the Cox case.
140 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 826-32 (1959). See Starrs, The Post-Conviction Hear-
ing Act-1949-1960 and Beyond, 10 DE PAUL L. REV. 397 (1961).
141 See People v. Ephraim, 411 111. 118, 103 N.E.2d 363 (1952).
142 People v. Cox, 12 1ll.2d 265, 271, 146 N.E.2d 19, 23 (1957).
143,,... [Otherwise, an accused would be tempted to seek unlicensed and un-
qualified representation in the hope of gaining acquittal, but with the assurance of
gaining a new trial even if convicted." Id. at 271, 146 N.E.2d at 23.
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Cox himself,144 nor that the defendant was a fourteen-year-old boy on
trial for a capital offense; it was a combination of all of these factors.
In People v. DeSimone,145 another exception to the "general rule,"
the defendant's counsel was an attorney licensed to practice in this
state; he was also the attorney of the defendant's choice. His incompe-
tence, however, was beyond question. 146 The "utter incompetency" of
the defendant's counsel was such in this case as to not even require
that the court discuss the general rule pertaining to counsel of the de-
fendant's own choice. Rather, the court concluded that where the
representation of an accused is of such a low caliber as to amount to no
representation at all, the accused will be considered to have been
denied due process of law.
The DeSimone case and the Cox case have one interesting aspect in
common: both were murder cases. In Cox, however, the jury set the
punishment at fourteen years, the shortest term possible under the
statute.'47 In DeSimone the jury set the punishment for one defendant
at death and for the other at forty years in the penitentiary. 48 Hence,
despite the conclusiveness of the evidence, the court followed its well-
established practice of reversing death penalty cases whenever substan-
tial error occurs, whether the evidence is conclusive or not.149 In con-
clusion, then, it may be stated as a corollary to the general rule holding
defendants responsible for counsel of their own choice, that whenever
other serious considerations enter into the problem and the accused is
denied cardinal rights because of his counsel's incompetency, the court
1441". . [Elven though it is to be realized that the defendant's acquiescence in Sim-
mons stemmed from parental obedience rather than voluntary acceptance, we have
no choice other than to hold that the right to be defended by a licensed attorney, as
embodied in section 9 of article II of our constitution, was effectively waived and
that such waiver was binding on the defendant. Were we to hold otherwise, every
minor defendant convicted of a crime could, upon coming of age, disclaim acquiescence
in his counsel, whether such counsel had been employed by his parents or appointed
by the court." Id. at 272, 146 N.E.2d at 23-24.
145 9 Ill.2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
146 See examples cited by the court from the record. Id. at 530, 138 N.E.2d at 558-60.
147 ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 360 (1959).
148 Two other defendants, represented by different counsel, were acquitted.
149 See also People v. Dukes, 12 Ill.2d 334, 339, 146 N.E.2d 14, 17 (1957): "From the
evidence in this case, we conclude that the jury was justified in returning a verdict
of guilty and that the death penalty may well have been warranted. But our review
cannot end with that observation. We must determine whether prejudicial errors were
committed during the trial which deprived the defendant of those constitutional safe-
guards which, under our laws, are afforded to the guilty as well as the innocent."
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will consider the effect upon his constitutional rights of his counsel's
incompetency.
Aside from the problems of incompetent counsel, the court has also
dealt with the seemingly more simple problem of the right to counsel.
In People v. Friedrich' it was contended that the defendant's right to
counsel of his own choice had been abridged. During the initial stages
of the case, counsel for Friedrich also represented a second defendant.
Thereafter, the second defendant moved for a severance on the
grounds that various statements made and acts done by Friedrich ren-
dered the defenses of the two antagonistic and that if they were jointly
tried the defendants' right to a fair and impartial trial would be
jeopardized.' 5 The trial court refused, however, to allow counsel to
represent both defendants and pursue the motion on the grounds
alleged. Counsel withdraw as attorney for Friedrich and the court
allowed the severance. Subsequently, Friedrich petitioned the court to
allow him to be represented by his former counsel, stating that he
knew of his employment by the other defendant at the time he first
retained him, and that the second defendant had consented to and ap-
proved of his re-retaining counsel. Friedrich further offered to obtain
the express consent of his co-defendant to the re-employment of coun-
sel. The court denied the petition, stating that he would allow both
defendants to be represented by the same counsel only if they would
agree to be tried together. 52
In arriving at the conclusion that Friedrich had been denied his right
to be represented by counsel of his own choice, the court held that the
same grounds which authorize a severance do not necessarily preclude
an attorney from representing the two parties seeking the severance.
Nor did canon 6 of the CANONS OF ETHICS OF THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR
1 20 l.2d 240, 169 N.E.2d 752 (1960).
151 See also People v. Lindsay, 412 Ill. 472, 107 N.E.2d 614 (1952). (A severance
should be granted where defenses are antagonistic or where circumstances are such as
to make it unfair to require joint trial.)
152 Thereafter, the defendant obtained the services of another counsel, but prior
to trial he informed the court that his retention of other counsel and the fact that
he was going to trial with other counsel did not constitute a waiver of his right to
be represented by his first choice.
15a Canon 6, "Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests," provides: "It is the duty
of a lawyer at the the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances
of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connection with the controversy,
which might influence the client in the selection of counsel.
"It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of
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AssoCIATION 5 a preclude the attorney from representing these defend-
ants. In fact, the court concluded:
It does not appear that any one of the prohibitions contained in the canon
was about to be violated in the event Zahler and defendant continued to be
represented by the same attorney. As stated above a full disclosure of the
facts was made to both parties and the express consent of each of them was
offered. Nor is there any indication that in separate trials counsel could not
give his undivided loyalty to each without adversely affecting the interest of
the other.'"
And, assuming even that the interests of the two defendants were so
antagonistic as to require separate counsel, the court held that
•.. the defendant had the unquestioned privilege to waive his right to separate
counsel. His action in insisting that he be represented by Bellows did waive
that right and . . . he now has grounds to complain that he was deprived of
counsel of his own choice. 15 5
From the area of constitutional rights, we turn to an area which has
always held the interest of the practitioner, the "crime" of contempt.
Although criminal contempt is not precisely a crimej 50 it has been
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this
canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his
duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.
"The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge
his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers or em-
ployment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with
respect to which confidence has been reposed."
For a discussion of the developments in Legal Ethics in Illinois in the past decade
see "Viles, A Commentary on the Ethics of the Legal Profession in the '50's, 10 DE PAUL
L. REV. 480 (1961).
154 People v. Friedrich, 20 Ill.2d 240, 252, 169 N.E.2d 752, 759 (1960).
155 Id. at 255, 169 N.E.2d at 760.
156 "Contempts are not crimes within the meaning of the statute defining misde-
meanors." People ex rel. Rusch v. Jilovsky, 334 Ill. 536, 538, 166 N.E. 108, 109 (1929).
And yet, on other occasions the court has held that a criminal contempt is a
crime against the court and against the people, and is a misdemeanor. People v.
Howarth, 415 IM. 499, 114 N.E.2d 785 (1953). The statute of limitations applicable in
misdemeanor cases, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 631 (1959), applies in cases of criminal con-
tempt, Beattie v. People, 33 11. App. 651 (1889). A contemnor is punishable under the
statute, ILL. REV. STAr. ch. 38, S 600 (1959), providing general misdemeanor punishment.
The State is precluded from seeking review of adverse decisions on the merits in cases
of criminal contempts. People ex rel. Blumle v. Neil, 74 Ill. 68 (1874). And, until the
recent innovation making appeal possible in criminal cases, a conviction for criminal
contempt was reviewable only by writ of error, and appellate jurisdiction lay as in
misdemeanor cases. People v. Howarth, 415 Ill. 499, 114 N.E.2d 785 (1953). However,
a criminal contempt is not such a crime as must be prosecuted in the name of the
People of the State of Illinois. ILL. CoNsT. art. VI, S 33; People v. Goss, 10 Ill.2d 533,
141 N.E.2d 385 (1957). Absent a statute, there is no right to trial by jury in any con-
tempt proceeding. People ex rel. Martin v. Panchire, 311 IMI. 622, 143 N.E. 476 (1924).
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more or less appropriated to the field of criminal law by the practicing
attorney. The most significant change in the Illinois law of contempt
occurred in 1952 when the Supreme Court abolished the common-law
defense of purgation by oath. Until then, a defendant who was
charged with an indirect criminal contempt 5 7 could file a verified an-
swer denying the alleged wrongful conduct, and such denial would be
conclusive on the court and a complete purge of the contempt
charged.158 Thereafter, if the denial under oath was false, the People's
remedy lay in a prosecution for perjury. 5 " This method of defense
was unavailable in a prosecution for direct contempt. 160
In People v. Gholson,161 the respondents were charged with at-
tempting to influence the trial of a criminal proceeding in which they
were defendants-an indirect contempt. The respondents filed verified
answers denying certain allegations contained in the petition filed by
the State, and admitting others, but further denying any unlawful in-
tent in connection with the matters admitted. Had the court applied
the doctrine of purgation by oath, the defendant's answer would have
been a complete defense to the charges made." 2 After tracing the ob-
scure origin and reasoning of the rule, the court concluded that the
defense of purgation by oath ".... has taken its place with ordeal and
wager of law and trial by battle among the dimly remembered curios
of outworn modes of trial."'," Hence the doctrine was discarded, and
for its reasoning the court gave the following:
157 "An indirect contempt is one which occurs out of the presence of the judge and
is therefore dependent for its proof upon evidence of some kind or upon facts of which
the court has no judicial notice.... When the contempt is not an apparent one and its
demonstration depends upon the proof of facts of which the court has no judicial
notice, due process requires a citation in order that defendant may meet and refute
the charges." People v. Howarth, 415 111. 499, 508, 114 N.E.2d 785, 790 (1953); People
v. Harrison, 403 I1. 320,86 N.E.2d 208 (1949).
158 Crook v. People, 16 IMI. 534 (1855); People v. McDonald, 314 Ill. 548, 145 N.E.
636 (1924); People v. Whitlow, 357 I11. 34, 191 N.E. 222 (1934); People v. Gholson, 412
111.294, 106 N.E.2d 333 (1952).
159People v. McLaughlin, 334 Ill. 354, 166 N.E. 67 (1929); People v. McDonald,
314 Ill. 548, 145 N.E. 636 (1924); Pcople v. Gholson, 412 I11. 294, 106 N.E.2d 333 (1952).
160 People v. Ryan, 410 111. 486, 103 NE.2d 116 (1951).
101 412 IM. 294, 106 N.E.2d 333 (1952).
162 In the trial court the parties and the court itself proceeded upon the assump-
tion that the doctrine would be effective if a proper denial were filed. The trial court
held, however, that the defendants' answers were insufficient to purge them of con-
tempt. The Supreme Court, in discussing the doctrine, held that the answers were
sufficient.
163 People v. Gholson, 412 Ill. 294, 301, 106 N.E.2d 333, 337 (1952).
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We do not believe a court can adequately, prompdy and efficiently protect
and preserve its judicial authority and processes, the rights of litigants, and
the interest of the people in the integrity and authority of their courts, with-
out power to inquire into and determine if contumacious acts such as alleged
in the instant case have been perpetrated against the court. We believe that
if the contemnor can, merely by denying the charges, deprive the court of
authority to inquire into the truthfulness of his denial not only of his intentions
but also as to his overt acts, that would tend to destroy rather than to uphold
public confidence and respect in our courts. The alternative resort to prosecu-
tion for perjury is without reason, ineffectual and inadequate. A person could
admit any ambiguous acts and merely deny evil intention. Prosecution for
perjury would be impossible .... It seems to us ... the court should have the
same power to protect its integrity by an orderly judicial inquiry into alleged
acts of indirect criminal contempt [as it has in cases of direct contempts]. 14
Turning to the area of defenses in general, we find that the court
has rendered a significant number of decisions in the past decade
which, while not innovations in themselves, have cleared up prior ob-
scurities. The defense of insanity, especially the methods for raising
the defense at a particular stage of a criminal proceeding, has always
concerned the trial lawyer. In People v. Burson,165 the court illustrated
the procedures to be followed when a defendant's insanity is sus-
pected. The Burson case itself is a fine example of the fact that ". . . a
defendant who either cannot or will not accept the responsibility of
conducting his own defense, can so hinder the ordinary functioning of
the judicial process as to render difficult any rational disposition of his
case."' 6 Burson had been indicted for a murder. Prior to, during, and
164 Id. at 302, 106 N.E.2d at 337-38.
165 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957). A most interesting feature of this decision is
the fact that the court raised the deciding issues on its own motion. The language of
the court so clearly expounds the role of the Supreme Court and the realistic views
which it has taken toward the administration of criminal justice, that its inclusion herein
is deemed mandatory. Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the full court, said:
"We recognize that counsel for defendant did not present or argue this point; and
that the general rule is that where a question is not raised or reserved in the trial court
or where, though raised in the lower court, it is not urged or argued on appeal, it will
not be considered and will be deemed to have been waived. However, this is a rule of
administration and not of jurisdiction or power, and it will not operate to deprive an
accused of his constitutional rights of due process. 'The court may, as a mater of grace,
in a case involving deprivation of life or liberty, take notice of errors appearing upon
the record which deprived the accused of substantial means of enjoying a fair and im-
partial trial, although no exceptions were preserved or the question is imperfectly
presented.' 3 Am.Jur., sec. 248, page 33; United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. United
States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775, 91 LEd. 973; People v. Jung Hing, 212 N.Y. 393, 106
N.E 105; State v. Griffin, 129 S.C. 200, 124 S.E. 81, 35 A.L.R. 1227." Id. at 370, 143 N.E.2d
at 245.
166 Id. at 373, 143 N.E.2d at 246.
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even after trial he exhibited an inability to aid or cooperate with ap-
pointed counsel. He insisted upon representing himself," 7 and his efforts
in this respect no doubt precipitated much of the concern expressed by
the court. Starting with the proposition that "the trial, adjudication, sen-
tence, or execution of a person charged with a criminal offense, while
insane, is a violation of due process of law,"' 6 the court set forth the
procedures to be followed when counsel, including the State's Attor-
ney, or the trial court suspect that the defendant is possibly insane,
either before trial, during trial, or after trial.
Although section 13 of division II of the CRIMINAL CODE provides
for a sanity hearing to determine if an accused is competent to stand
trial for a criminal offense, that statute was not intended to abrogate
the common-law rule that no person shall be compelled to stand trial
for any criminal offense while insane.170 Thus, a formal petition for the
hearing provided for by the statute is not necessary. The question of
the accused's capacity to stand trial may be raised by oral motion of
counsel at any time during trial, and, if made in good faith and not for
the purpose of delay, it then becomes the duty of the trial court to em-
panel a jury to hear the issue of the accused's capacity to stand trial. 171
The test of the accused's capacity to stand trial is his capacity to make
a rational defense: "He should be capable of understanding the nature
and object of the proceedings against him, his own condition in refer-
ence to such proceedings, and have sufficient mind to conduct his de-
fense in a rational and reasonable manner, although upon other subjects
his mind may be unsound or deranged.' 172 The ability to conduct his
167 And the defendant had every right to do so, see People v. Ephraim, 411 Ill. 118,
103 N.E.2d 363 (1952), subject to the following conditions: "If then sane, the de-
fendant, upon the waiver of counsel, had the right to defend himself, subject to the
constant duty of the court to protect the judicial process from deterioration occasioned
by improper or inadequate conduct of the defense. In such situation the court pos-
sesses broad discretion in relation to the appointment of counsel for advisory or other
limited purposes, or to supersede the defendant in the conduct of the defense." People
v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 373, 143 N.E.2d 239, 247 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
168 Id. at 368, 143 N.E.2d at 244.
169 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 593 (1959).
170 People v. Burson, 11 Ill.2d 360, 143 N.E.2d 239 (1957).
171 The trial court's failure to do so may result in a denial of due process. Brown v.
People, 8 Ill.2d 540, 134 N.E.2d 760 (1956) (Trial judge may not be arbitrary in deny-
ing hearing when bona fide issue of sanity raised).
Notice that either counsel for the defendant or the State, or the trial court, on its
own motion, may raise the issue of the defendant's capacity to stand trial. Id. at 372,
143 N.E.2d at 245.
172 Id. at 369, 143 N.E.2d at 244; People v. Geary, 298 Ill. 236, 131 N.E. 652 (1921).
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defense in a rational and reasonable manner implies that the defendant
is capable of cooperating with his counsel "to the end that any avail-
able defenses may be interposed.' 173
Section 13 of division II also provides that no judgment shall be
entered if, after a verdict of guilty, the defendant shall have become
insane; and, if judgment has been entered and then the defendant be-
comes insane, execution of the judgment shall be stayed until recov-
ery.174 The court in Burson held that if the issue of insanity shall arise
at either of these times, it then becomes the duty of the trial court to
impanel a jury to determine the issue of sanity,170 and the fact that the
issue is presented in a motion for a new trial rather than in a formal
petition requesting a hearing on the issue of sanity is immaterial. The
test for determining insanity in such a post-sentence hearing was out-
lined by the court in People v. Carpenter:17  "[1] [W]hether the
prisoner has sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the pro-
ceedings against him, [2] what he was tried for originally, [3] the
purpose of his punishment, [4] the impending fate which awaits him,
[5] a sufficient mind to know any facts which might exist which make
his punishment unjust or unlawful, and [6] sufficient intelligence to
convey such information to his attorney or the court. "177
Both Carpenter cases178 provide a wealth of material for the study
of the defense of insanity in Illinois. In the first case, 179 a writ of error
challenging the validity of Carpenter's trial and sentence to death,
the defendant urged the Durham test of insanity 80 upon the court.
The defendant challenged the instructions given by the trial court
which defined the test of criminal responsibility-that is, sanity at the
time of the commission of the offense-in accord with previous ex-
pressions by the Supreme Court. 18 ' He submitted that scientific reali-
173 Id. at 371, 143 N.E.2d at 245.
174 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, S 593 (1959).
175 This, of course, is in compliance with the substance of the statute.
176 13 Ill.2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 100 (1958).
177 Id. at 475, 150 N.E.2d at 103.
178 People v. Carpenter, 11 I1l.2d 60, 142 N.E.2d 11 (1957); People v. Carpenter, 13
Ill.2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 100 (1958).
179 People v. Carpenter, 11 ll.2d 60,142 N.E.2d 11 (1957).
180 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954); State v. Pike, 49 N.H.
399 (1870).
181 Illinois adheres to the following tests of insanity:
.. to establish a defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at
the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring under such a
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ties prompted the adoption of the Durham type instruction.8 2 The
court rejected this contention, observing that "the need in this area
is for more clarification, and the Durham instruction does not supply
it."'"" The old standards were reaffirmed.184
The second Carpenter case, 85 an appeal from a post-sentence jury
verdict finding Carpenter sane, raised two problems of trial procedure
of considerable constitutional import.18 6 During voir dire examination
of the prospective jurors the State was permitted to inquire as to the
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what
was wrong." McNagbten's Case, 10 Clark & Finnelly 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843).
"The mere ability to distinguish right from wrong is not the correct test .... the ac-
cused must also be mentally capable of choosing either to do or not to do the act, and
of governing his conduct in accordance with such choice." People v. Lowhone, 292
111. 32,48, 126 N.E. 620, 626 (1920).
The court has, within the last decade, explicitly ruled that evidence that the accused
is a psychopathic personality is inadmissible as tending to show lack of criminal re-
sponsibility at the time of the commission of the offense. "A subnormal mentality is
not a defense to a charge of crime unless the accused is by reason thereof unable to
distinguish between right and wrong with respect to the particular act in question."
People v. Jenko, 410 Ill. 478, 483, 102 N.E.2d 783, 785-86 (1952).
182 The defendant requested the trial judge to instruct the jury as follows:
"The Court instructs the jury that, unless you believe beyond a reasonable doubt
that Richard Daniel Carpenter was not suffering from a diseased or defective mental
condition, or, that if he is so afflicted, that the criminal act charged was not the product
of such diseased or defective mental condition, you must find the accused not guilty
by reason of insanity.
"Thus, your task would not be completed upon finding, if you did find, that Richard
Daniel Carpenter suffered from a mental disease or defect. He would still be responsi-
ble for his unlawful act if there was no causal relation between such mental abnormality
and the act. These questions must be determined by you from the facts which you find
to be fairly deducible from the testimony and the evidence in this case, keeping in
mind that the defense is not required to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, but,
rather, need only establish by the evidence a reasonable doubt of the sanity of Richard
Daniel Carpenter." People v. Carpenter, 11 Ill.2d 60, 63, 142 N.E.2d 11, 12-13 (1957).
183 The court observed that in the tendered instructions the terms "disease," "de-
fect," and "product" were left undefined, and on the whole, the instruction then was
vague and ambiguous, and suffered from a failure to define its own ambiguous terms. Id.
at 67, 142 N.E.2d at 15.
184 In fact, the court remarked, "From the substantive standpoint, there does not
seem to be any significant difference, especially as the instructions would be under-
stood by the ordinary jury. Both tests [Durham and the "Illinois Rule"] recognize
that criminal responsibility must take account of impairment of the will, as well as im-
pairment of the intellect. And, if anything, the given instructions are the more explicit,
articulate and useful." Ibid.
185 People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill.2d 470, 150 N.E.2d 100 (1958).
188 As was the case with the Sexual Psychopath Act, see supra note 11, no pro-
vision permitting appellate review is included in the statute providing for and govern-
ing sanity hearings, ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, S 593 (1959). Thus, an appeal from a hearing
under the act would not normally lie to either the Appellate or Supreme Courts. But,
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religious or conscientious scruples of the prospective jurors concerning
the death penalty. This, of course, is a permissive field of inquiry in
a criminal prosecution for which the death penalty may be imposed.1 7
The defendant argued, however, that a sanity hearing was not a trial
for a criminal offense, and, as the sole purpose of the proceeding was
to determine Carpenter's sanity as a prerequisite to execution of the
judgment imposed, the effect of the inquiry "was to direct the jury's
attention to the punishment which Carpenter was to suffer, rather than
to the matter of his insanity, [and thereby] ... deprive petitioner and
Carpenter of a fair and impartial jury, thus depriving them of due
process of law."'' 8 The court rejected this contention. The jury, it
held, must, because of the nature of the issue before them, "have
known that Carpenter had been sentenced to death and that the pur-
pose of the hearing was to determine whether he should be exe-
cuted."'8s9 Thus, in the sanity hearing, as in the original trial, the atti-
tude of a prospective juror with respect to the imposition of the
death penalty is relevant and material, for just as a juror in the original
trial may hesitate to return a verdict inflicting the extreme penalty
because of conscientious or religious scruples, so a juror in a sanity
hearing possessing the same scruples may hesitate to return a verdict
finding the prisoner sane. Since, in effect, the latter proceeding con-
firms the sentence in the former proceeding, the same procedures may
be taken to protect the rights of the prosecution according to the
statute.
The second contention in the Carpenter case was that it was a vio-
lation of due process for the trial court to compel Carpenter to under-
go a pre-trial mental examination by three psychiatrists chosen by the
State. The principal basis of this argument was that the defendant had
an absolute right to the inviolability of his person and that he could
where personal liberties are involved, the court has held that a writ of error lies by
force of the common law, in the absence of a statute, to determine whether the
defendant had received a fair trial in accordance with "the law of the land." People v.
Scott, 326 IMI. 327, 157 NE. 247 (1927); People v. Kadens, 399 111. 394, 78 N.E.2d 289
(1948). The court, in the Carpenter case, decided, in conformity with the holdings in
Scott and Kadens, that the personal liberty of the defendant was involved, and that
since fairly debatable constitutional issues concerning the conduct of the trial were
presented, it would take jurisdiction.
187 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, 5 743 (1959); People v. Winchester, 352 II. 237, 185 N.E.
580 (1933).
188 People v. Carpenter, 13 U.2d 470,475, 150 N.E.2d 100, 103 (1958).
189 Id. at 476, 150 N.E.2d at 103.
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not be compelled to submit to any examination over his objections.
The court pointed out, however, that People ex rel. Noren v. De7np-
sey' ° overruled this basis by permitting an examination to be ordered
by the court "where one, by his own act, puts in issue his physical
or mental condition."u.' Since Carpenter, (or more properly his sister
acting on his behalf), put his mental condition in issue by the very
nature of the proceeding, it became a fact in controversy in the case
and the examination was proper.
A further argument made by Carpenter in support of his second
contention raises a point that has considerable merit in the light of
practical experience, and, although the court rejected this argument
on the grounds that a violation of due process was not involved, an
eventual solution is desirable. Three psychiatrists examined Carpenter
for the State. Assuming the validity of the order permitting one psy-
chiatrist to examine him for the purpose of discovery, it was argued
that the examination by the other two was unnecessary and resulted
190 10 Ill.2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 780 (1957). Although the Noren case involved the ques-
tion of whether a judge, in a personal injury suit, could compel the plaintiff to submit
to a physical examination, the court, in considering the problem, discussed People v.
Scott, 326 11. 327, 157 N.E. 247 (1927), in which the court had held that it was error,
in a sanity hearing, to allow the State to prove that the defendant had refused to
allow doctors appointed by the court to examine him, and that the trial court was
without authority to appoint alienists to examine the defendant with a view to testify-
ing as the court's witnesses. The court, in Noren, expressly overruled Scott and the
other cases which had held that the trial court was without authority to require an
examination.
The Scott case, which was at the base of Carpenter's contention that the trial court
had denied him constitutional rights in compelling him to undergo an examination,
was, on its facts, stronger than both Noren and Carpenter. Both Carpenter and the
plaintiff in Noren were the moving parties in their lawsuits, and the court specifically
recognized this in the Carpenter case. But in Scott, the defendant had already been
committed as an insane person. The order appointing alienists to examine the defendant
resulted from the motion of the State to restore the defendant's sanity so that he could
be executed in accordance with the sentence that had been imposed upon him prior
to the original hearing on his sanity. While the defendant had initiated the original
hearing, the State had initiated the proceeding in which the order was entered. People
v. Scott, 326 111. 327, 157 N.E. 247 (1927). If Scott was overruled on the premise that
examination is warranted where one puts his physical or mental condition in issue, the
only basis for applying this premise to Scott must be that the petition of the State
seeking the restoration of a person previously declared insane is a continuation of the
original petition by the defendant seeking an adjudication of insanity. This is sup-
ported only inferentially by that part of S 593 which provides that after an adjudication
of insanity, execution of sentence shall be stayed "until the recovery of said person
from the insanity or lunacy." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 593 (1959); cf. People v. Scott,
326 Ill. 327, 157 N.E. 247 (1927). Of course, it may also be that the original petition by
the defendant under the statute waives for all further proceedings involving the same
issue his right to inviolability of his person.
191 People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill.2d 470,476, 150 N.E.2d 100, 104 (1958).
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in the State's being allowed to overwhelm the petitioner at the hearing.
Because of limited means, the petitioner was unable to secure the aid
of more than one psychiatrist in Carpenter's defense. Thus Carpenter
was placed, by the order of the trial court, in a position of having to
aid the State in overwhelming him. The court accepted the argument
that examinations by the last two psychiatrists were unnecessary for
discovery and that they were for the purpose of obtaining evidence,
but went on to say:
To so hold does not, however, mean that these rulings deprived Carpenter of
due process of law. It must be kept in mind that on this appeal we are not
concerned with the weight or sufficiency of the evidence nor with any pro-
cedural errors which may have occured at the trial. Our concern is only that
Carpenter was afforded a fair hearing and one which complied with the re-
quirements of due process of law.'
9 2
Hence, although it may have conceded that the appointment of three
psychiatrists was improper and may have tended to overwhelm Car-
penter, the court concluded that it was only concerned with whether
or not the hearing was so unfair as to violate the concepts of funda-
mental fairness. And such violation could only be demonstrated by a
showing that
• . . the psychiatrists employed by the State were biased and prejudiced and
that their testimony was not an honest evaluation of their examination, for
certainly it cannot offend due process of law for one who puts in issue the
question of his insanity to have the benefit of all of the expert evidence
obtainable.' 93
It was in this respect that Carpenter's efforts failed.
CONCLUSION
As this is being written the Proposed Illinois Revised Criminal Code
is being considered by the Illinois Legislature. That work, the product
of over six years of effort by the Joint Committee of the Illinois State
Bar Association and the Chicago Bar Association to Revise the Illinois
Criminal Code, if enacted, will be the first actual "Criminal Code"
in Illinois and will represent the first substantial revision of our crim-
inal laws since 1874. The object of the Proposed Criminal Code is not
to render archaic that which has gone before it; its purpose is to collect
the great body of substantive criminal law now scattered throughout
the 148 chapters of the statutes, discard that which is useless, revise
192 Id. at 478, 150 N.E.2d at 104-05. Indeed, this was the sole basis on which the court
assumed jurisdiction to decide the appeal. See supra note 186.
193 Id. at 480, 150 N.E.2d at 106.
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that which needs revising, and add that which needs to be added. In
this context it is hoped that what has been herein expounded will not
be rendered useless, for, as is noted in the Committee Comments to
the Proposed Code:
. . . [T]he supersession of all common-law definitions of particular offenses
does not mean that the large mass of interpretative rules developed under the
common law is superseded: these rules are a highly valuable part of our
criminal law, and their effective replacement by statutory law would be ex-
ceedingly difficult.19 4
And, it is felt that the above comments apply with equal vigor to the
body of interpretative rules developed under our former criminal
statutes, wherever they may be applied.
But, if the authors may be excused for their pride in the product
of the Committee, and with due apologies to the editors of the
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW, they would rather that their work be rendered
impotent than that the Proposed Criminal Code be rejected.
19 4t ILL. STATE AND CHICAGO BAR Ass'Ns, JOINT COMMITTEE, TENTATIVE FINAL DRAFT OF
THE PROPOSED ILLINOIS REVISED CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961, Comments 104 (1960).
